Courts in India are conferred with various innumerable inherent powers. Be it under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (available with all civil courts) or with the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or for what matter under Article 226 and 142 of the Constitution with the High Courts and the Supreme Court respectively. Strictly speaking, these powers are unfettered. However by convention, the courts have framed their own rules of limiting the exercise of powers to selective situations. For example we had written recently over the power of the Supreme Court under Article 142 and the unwritten rule that it shall not be exercised where a statutory provision provides for the situation.
In this post we cover a similar concept popularly known amongst the lawyers as "(the limitation) of alternate remedy" in as much as it is now well settled that the inherent powers of the High Courts to issue prerogative writs or order otherwise in terms of Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Courts will careful test the reliefs claimed against the bar of alternate remedy. The rule bars the claimant from invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court in the instances where the claimant has a remedy available to him elsewhere (for example an appeal before a Tribunal) and thus even though High Court can interfere, it would not interfere and relegate the claimant to exhaust other remedies before approaching the High Court.
In this post we cover a similar concept popularly known amongst the lawyers as "(the limitation) of alternate remedy" in as much as it is now well settled that the inherent powers of the High Courts to issue prerogative writs or order otherwise in terms of Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Courts will careful test the reliefs claimed against the bar of alternate remedy. The rule bars the claimant from invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court in the instances where the claimant has a remedy available to him elsewhere (for example an appeal before a Tribunal) and thus even though High Court can interfere, it would not interfere and relegate the claimant to exhaust other remedies before approaching the High Court.
In its decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. reported at AIR 2005 SC 3856, the Supreme Court explained the rule of 'alternate remedy' in the following terms
18. We shall first deal with the plea regarding alternative remedy as raised by the appellant-State. Except for a period when Article 226 was amended by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, the power relating to alternative remedy has been considered to be a rule of self imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and never a rule of law. Despite the existence of an alternative remedy it is within the jurisdiction of discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. At the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that though the matter relating to an alternative remedy has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the case, normally the High Court should not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy. If somebody approaches the High Court without availing the alternative remedy provided the High Court should ensure that he has made out a strong case or that there exist good grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction.
19. Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Sons v. Income Tax Investigation Commission and Ors., AIR (1954) SC 207; Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah and Ors., AIR (1955) SC 425; Union of India v. T.R. Varma, AIR (1957) SC 882; State of U.P. and Ors. v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR (1958) SC 86 and M/s K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Madras, AIR (1966) SC 1089, held that Article 226 of the Constitution confers on all the High Courts a very wide power in the matter of issuing writs. However, the remedy of writ is an absolutely discretionary remedy and the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of principles of natural justice or procedure required for decision has not been adopted.
20. Another Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Bhailal Bhai etc.etc., AIR (1964) SC 1006, held that the remedy provided in a writ jurisdiction is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil court or to deny defence legitimately open in such actions. The power to give relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary power. Similar view has been reiterated in N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar and Ors., AIR (1959) SC 422; Municipal Council, Khurai and Anr. v. Kamal Kumar and Anr., AIR (1965) SC 1321; Siliguri Municipality and Ors. v. Amalendu Das and Ors., AIR (1984) SC 653; S.T. Muthusami v. K. Natarajan and Ors., AIR (1988) SC 616; R.S.R.T.C. and Anr. v. Krishna Kant and Ors., AIR (1995) SC 1715; Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. v. Kurien E. Kalathil and Ors., AIR (2000) SC 2573; A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan and Ors., [2000] 7 SCC 695; and L.L. Sudhakar Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., [2001] 6 SCC 634; Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., [2001] 8 SCC 509; Pratap Singh and Anr. v. State of Haryana, [2002] 7 SCC 484 and G.K.N. Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and Ors., [2003] 1 SCC 72.
21. In Harbans Lal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., [2003] 2 SCC 107, this Court held that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion and the Court must consider the pros and cons of the case and then may interfere if it comes to the conclusion that the petitioner seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; where there is failure of principles of natural justice or where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.
22. In G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., AIR (1952) SC 192; Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd., AIR (1985) SC 330; Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura, AIR (1999) SC 294; Shivgonda Anna Patil and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., AIR (1999) SC 2281; C.A. Abraham v. I.T.O. Kottayam and Ors., AIR (1961) SC 609; Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Anr., AIR (1983) SC 603; H.B. Gandhi v. M/s Gopinath and Sons, [1992] Suppl. 2 SCC 312; Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Ors., AIR (1999) SC 22; Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR (1999) SC 74; Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh, [1999] 1 SCC 209 and Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan and Ors. [2001] 6 SCC 569, this Court held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction.
23. If, as was noted in Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana and Ors. AIR (1985) SC 1147 the appeal is from "Caeser to Caeser's wife" the existence of alternative remedy would be a mirage and an exercise in futility. In the instant case the writ petitioners had indicated the reasons as to why they thought that the alternative remedy would not be efficacious. Though the High Court did not go into that plea relating to bias in detail, yet it felt that alternative remedy would not be a bar to entertain the writ petition. Since the High Court has elaborately dealt with the question as to why the statutory remedy available was not efficacious, it would not be proper for this Court to consider the question again. When the High Court had entertained a writ petition notwithstanding existence of an alternative remedy this Court while dealing with the matter in an appeal should not permit the question to be raised unless the High Court's reasoning for entertaining the writ petition is found to be palpably unsound and irrational. Similar view was expressed by this Court in First Income-Tax Officer, Salem v. M/s. Short Brothers (P) Ltd., [1966] 3 SCR 84 and State of U.P. and Ors. v. M/s. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., [1977] 2 SCC 724. That being the position, we do not consider the High Court's judgment to be vulnerable on the ground that alternative remedy was not availed. There are two well recognized exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies. First is when the proceedings are taken before the forum under a provision of law which is ultra vires, it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court for quashing the proceedings on the ground that they are incompetent without a party being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course. Secondly, the doctrine has no application when the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. We may add that where the proceedings itself are an abuse of process of law the High Court in an appropriate case can entertain a writ petition.
24. Where under a statute there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights or when on the undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly, AIR (1971) SC 33 that if the High Court had entertained a petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non exhaustion of statutory remedies; unless the High Court finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be desirable to deal with them in a writ petition.
25. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to take note of the few expressions in Reg v. Hillington, London Borough Council, (1974) 1 QB 720 which seems to bring out well the position. Lord Widgery, C.J. stated in this case: "It has always been a principle that certiorari will go only where there is no other equally effective and convenient remedy..." The statutory system of appeals is more effective and more convenient than application for certiorari and the principal reason why it may prove itself more convenient and more effective is that an appeal to (say) the Secretary of State can be disposed of at one hearing whether the issue between them is a matter of law or fact or policy or opinion or a combination of some or all of these ........whereas of course an appeal for certiorari is limited to cases where the issue is a matter of law and then only it is a matter of law appearing on the face of the order." "An application for certiorari has however this advantage that it is speedier and cheaper than the other methods and in a proper case therefore it may well be right to allow it to be used.....I would, however, define a proper case as being one where the decision in question is liable to be upset as a matter of law because on its face it is clearly made without jurisdiction or in consequence of an error of law." After all the above discussion, the following observations of Roskill L.J. in Hanson v. Church Commissioner, (1978) QB 823 may not be welcomed but it should not be forgotten also: "There are a number of shoals and very little safe water in the unchartered seas which divide the line between prerogative orders and statutory appeals, and I do not propose to plunge into those seas...."
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