In a recent decision [Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.] the Supreme Court of India, reversing the decision of the Competition Appellate Tribunal has declared that no opportunity of hearing was required to be given by the Competition Commission of India to any person before beginning to investigate a case or complaint. The Appellate Tribunal had declared that the principles of natural justice were inviolable and thus hearing opportunity was mandatory whereas the Commission of the opinion that if such opportunity was given the very basis of investigation would be eroded away, and thus appealed against the order of the Tribunal to the Supreme Court.
The Bench formulated for itself the issues required to be answered in terms of the powers of the Competition Commission and the procedure to be followed and thereon went to states answers of the same. We have taken the liberty to matching the issues posed and the answers provided for the benefit of our readers in the following terms;
Q1) Whether the directions passed by the Commission in exercise of its powers under Section 26(1) of the Act forming a prima facie opinion would be appealable in terms of Section 53A(1) of the Act?
A1) In terms of Section 53A(1)(a) of the Act appeal shall lie only against such directions, decisions or orders passed by the Commission before the Tribunal which have been specifically stated under the provisions of Section 53A(1)(a). The orders, which have not been specifically made appealable, cannot be treated appealable by implication. For example taking a prima facie view and issuing a direction to the Director General for investigation would not be an order appealable under Section 53A.
Q2) What is the ambit and scope of power vested with the Commission under Section 26(1) of the Act and whether the parties, including the informant or the affected party, are entitled to notice or hearing, as a matter of right, at the preliminary stage of formulating an opinion as to the existence of the prima facie case?
A2) Neither any statutory duty is cast on the Commission to issue notice or grant hearing, nor any party can claim, as a matter of right, notice and/or hearing at the stage of formation of opinion by the Commission, in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act that a prima facie case exists for issuance of a direction to the Director General to cause an investigation to be made into the matter. However, the Commission, being a statutory body exercising, inter alia, regulatory jurisdiction, even at that stage, in its discretion and in appropriate cases may call upon the concerned party(s) to render required assistance or produce requisite information, as per its directive. The Commission is expected to form such prima facie view without entering upon any adjudicatory or determinative process. The Commission is entitled to form its opinion without any assistance from any quarter or even with assistance of experts or others. The Commission has the power in terms of Regulation 17 (2) of the Regulations to invite not only the information provider but even ‘such other person’ which would include all persons, even the affected parties, as it may deem necessary. In that event it shall be ‘preliminary conference’, for whose conduct of business the Commission is entitled to evolve its own procedure.
Q3) Whether the Commission would be a necessary, or at least a proper, party in the proceedings before the Tribunal in an appeal preferred by any party?
A3) The Commission, in cases where the inquiry has been initiated by the Commission suo moto, shall be a necessary party and in all other cases the Commission shall be a proper party in the proceedings before the Competition Tribunal. The presence of the Commission before the Tribunal would help in complete adjudication and effective and expeditious disposal of matters. Being an expert body, its views would be of appropriate assistance to the Tribunal. Thus, the Commission in the proceedings before the Tribunal would be a necessary or a proper party, as the case may be.
Q4) At what stage and in what manner the Commission can exercise powers vested in it under Section 33 of the Act to pass temporary restraint orders?
A4) During an inquiry and where the Commission is satisfied that the act is in contravention of the provisions stated in Section 33 of the Act, it may issue an order temporarily restraining the party from carrying on such act, until the conclusion of such inquiry or until further orders without giving notice to such party, where it deems it necessary. This power has to be exercised by the Commission sparingly and under compelling and exceptional circumstances. The Commission, while recording a reasoned order inter alia should : (a) record its satisfaction (which has to be of much higher degree than formation of a prima facie view under Section 26(1) of the Act) in clear terms that an act in contravention of the stated provisions has been committed and continues to be committed or is about to be committed; (b) It is necessary to issue order of restraint and (c) from the record before the Commission, it is apparent that there is every likelihood of the party to the lis, suffering irreparable and irretrievable damage or there is definite apprehension that it would have adverse effect on competition in the market.
The power under Section 33 of the Act to pass temporary restraint order can only be exercised by the Commission when it has formed prima facie opinion and directed investigation in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act, as is evident from the language of this provision read with Regulation 18(2) of the Regulations.
Q5) Whether it is obligatory for the Commission to record reasons for formation of a prima facie opinion in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act?
A5) In consonance with the settled principles of administrative jurisprudence, the Commission is expected to record at least some reason even while forming a prima facie view. However, while passing directions and orders dealing with the rights of the parties in its adjudicatory and determinative capacity, it is required of the Commission to pass speaking orders, upon due application of mind, responding to all the contentions raised before it by the rival parties.
Q6) What directions, if any, need to be issued by the Court to ensure proper compliance in regard to procedural requirements while keeping in mind the scheme of the Act and the legislative intent? Also to ensure that the procedural intricacies do not hamper in achieving the object of the Act, i.e., free market and competition.
A6) ... Certain procedural directions will help in avoiding prejudicial consequences, against any of the parties to the proceedings and the possibility of abuse of jurisdiction by the parties can be eliminated by proper exercise of discretion and for valid reasons. Courts have been issuing directions in appropriate cases and wherever the situation has demanded so. Administration of justice does not depend on individuals, but it has to be a collective effort at all levels of the judicial hierarchy, i.e. the hierarchy of the Courts or the fora before whom the matters are sub-judice, so that the persons awaiting justice can receive the same in a most expeditious and effective manner. The approach of the Commission even in its procedural matters, therefore, should be macro level rather than micro level. It must deal with all such references or applications expeditiously in accordance with law and by giving appropriate reasons. Thus, we find it necessary to issue some directions which shall remain in force till appropriate regulations in that regard are framed by the competent authority.
The Bench also issued certain directions to the observed by the Commission;
A) Regulation 16 prescribes limitation of 15 days for the Commission to hold its first ordinary meeting to consider whether prima facie case exists or not and in cases of alleged anti-competitive agreements and/or abuse of dominant position, the opinion on existence of prima facie case has to be formed within 60 days. Though the time period for such acts of the Commission has been specified, still it is expected of the Commission to hold its meetings and record its opinion about existence or otherwise of a prima facie case within a period much shorter than the stated period.B) All proceedings, including investigation and inquiry should be completed by the Commission/Director General most expeditiously and while ensuring that the time taken in completion of such proceedings does not adversely affect any of the parties as well as the open market in purposeful implementation of the provisions of the Act.C) Wherever during the course of inquiry the Commission exercises its jurisdiction to pass interim orders, it should pass a final order in that behalf as expeditiously as possible and in any case not later than 60 days.D) The Director General in terms of Regulation 20 is expected to submit his report within a reasonable time. No inquiry by the Commission can proceed any further in absence of the report by the Director General in terms of Section 26(2) of the Act. The reports by the Director General should be submitted within the time as directed by the Commission but in all cases not later than 45 days from the date of passing of directions in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act.E) The Commission as well as the Director General shall maintain complete ‘confidentiality’ as envisaged under Section 57 of the Act and Regulation 35 of the Regulations. Wherever the ‘confidentiality’ is breached, the aggrieved party certainly has the right to approach the Commission for issuance of appropriate directions in terms of the provisions of the Act and the Regulations in force.
In our considered view the scheme and essence of the Act and the Regulations are clearly suggestive of speedy and expeditious disposal of the matters. Thus, it will be desirable that the Competent Authority frames Regulations providing definite time frame for completion of investigation, inquiry and final disposal of the matters pending before the Commission. Till such Regulations are framed, the period specified by us supra shall remain in force and we expect all the concerned authorities to adhere to the period specified.
The background to the enactment of the Competition Act, 2002 was discussed the Bench in the following terms;
The decision of the Government of India to liberalize its economy with the intention of removing controls persuaded the Indian Parliament to enact laws providing for checks and balances in the free economy. The laws were required to be enacted, primarily, for the objective of taking measures to avoid anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance as well as to regulate mergers and takeovers which result in distortion of the market. The earlier Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 was not only found to be inadequate but also obsolete in certain respects, particularly, in the light of international economic developments relating to competition law. Most countries in the world have enacted competition laws to protect their free market economies- an economic system in which the allocation of resources is determined solely by supply and demand. The rationale of free market economy is that the competitive offers of different suppliers allow the buyers to make the best purchase. The motivation of each participant in a free market economy is to maximize self-interest but the result is favourable to society. As Adam Smith observed: “there is an invisible hand at work to take care of this”.
As far as American law is concerned, it is said that the Sherman Act, 1890, is the first codification of recognized common law principles of competition law. With the progress of time, even there the competition law has attained new dimensions with the enactment of subsequent laws, like the Clayton Act, 1914, the Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914 and the Robinson-Patman Act, 1936. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, introduced the considerably less stringent Restrictive Practices Act, 1956, but later on more elaborate legislations like the Competition Act, 1998 and the Enterprise Act, 2002 were introduced. Australia introduced its current Trade Practices Act in 1974. The overall intention of competition law policy has not changed markedly over the past century. Its intent is to limit the role of market power that might result from substantial concentration in a particular industry. The major concern with monopoly and similar kinds of concentration is not that being big is necessarily undesirable. However, because of the control exerted by a monopoly over price, there are economic efficiency losses to society and product quality and diversity may also be affected. Thus, there is a need to protect competition.
The primary purpose of competition law is to remedy some of those situations where the activities of one firm or two lead to the breakdown of the free market system, or, to prevent such a breakdown by laying down rules by which rival businesses can compete with each other. The model of perfect competition is the ‘economic model’ that usually comes to an economist’s mind when thinking about the competitive markets. As far as the objectives of competition laws are concerned, they vary from country to country and even within a country they seem to change and evolve over the time. However, it will be useful to refer to some of the common objectives of competition law. The main objective of competition law is to promote economic efficiency using competition as one of the means of assisting the creation of market responsive to consumer preferences. The advantages of perfect competition are threefold: allocative efficiency, which ensures the effective allocation of resources, productive efficiency, which ensures that costs of production are kept at a minimum and dynamic efficiency, which promotes innovative practices. These factors by and large have been accepted all over the world as the guiding principles for effective implementation of competition law.
In India, a High Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law was constituted to examine its various aspects and make suggestions keeping in view the competition policy of India. This Committee made recommendations and submitted its report on 22nd of May, 2002. After completion of the consultation process, the Competition Act, 2002 (for short, the ‘Act’) as Act 12 of 2003, dated 12th December, 2003, was enacted. As per the statement of objects and reasons, this enactment is India’s response to the opening up of its economy, removing controls and resorting to liberalization. The natural corollary of this is that the Indian market should be geared to face competition from within the country and outside. The Bill sought to ensure fair competition in India by prohibiting trade practices which cause appreciable adverse effect on the competition in market within India and for this purpose establishment of a quasi judicial body was considered essential. The other object was to curb the negative aspects of competition through such a body namely, the ‘Competition Commission of India’ (for short, the ‘Commission’) which has the power to perform different kinds of functions, including passing of interim orders and even awarding compensation and imposing penalty. The Director General appointed under Section 16(1) of the Act is a specialized investigating wing of the Commission. In short, the establishment of the Commission and enactment of the Act was aimed at preventing practices having adverse effect on competition, to protect the interest of the consumer and to ensure fair trade carried out by other participants in the market in India and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
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