10 leading Supreme Court decisions in March 2020

In the wake of the health crisis, all major institutions, including the Supreme Court, have shut down. We took this opportunity to get our act together and bring to you some premium content. Going in reverse order, we have cataloged 10 major decisions of the Supreme Court handed out in March 2020 in this post.

(1) Right to Information - Is is not pervasive 

In the case of Chief Information Commissioner v. High Court of Gujarat the Supreme Court (three-judge bench) has declared that every inconsistency between the RTI law and any other law as regards supply of information is not fatal. Therefore upholding the rules governing supply of information adopted by the High Court of Gujarat, the Supreme Court has opined that the High Court can imposed additional conditions for furnishing the information. In particular, the condition under the High Court Rules for filing affidavit and giving reasons as to why the information is required which, thought contrary to the RTI Act, has been upheld by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has also upheld the exclusion of the RTI Act, under the High Court rules, to the copies of judicial work of the High Court and the same can be sought only under the High Court rules and not under the RTI. [Civil Appeal No. 1966-1967/2020 dated 04.03.2020]

(2) Workers are also 'consumers' of Government Schemes

In this path breaking decision in the case of Joint Labour Commissioner and Registering Officer v. Kesar Lal the Supreme Court has expanded the scope of consumer laws to hold that even a worker who is denied benefit of Government schemes can successfully bring a case under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. In this case the Respondent Worker had applied for grants under the Building and Other Construction Workers’ (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 for purpose of his daughter's marriage. This was rejected by the Officer of the Rajasthan Government citing that the paperwork was not complete and formalities were not complied. The worker complained against this rejection under the consumer law and this came was finally upheld by the Supreme Court. [Civil Appeal No. 2014/2020 dated 17.03.2020]

(3) Proceedings for removal of 'probationer' not entitled to strict judicial review compared to confirmed employees

In the case of Rajasthan High Court v. Ved Priya the Supreme Court was concerned with correctness of view of the High Court (on its administrative side) which has removed the Respondent probationer from services as a judge of the lower court. This proceeding was challenged by way of writ petition before the High Court. The Supreme Court in this decision exhaustively surveyed the earlier decisions regarding the right of probationers to be confirmed and the corresponding right of the employer to remove the probationers. Upholding the removal, the Supreme Court specifically observed that unsatisfactory performance is sufficient for removal in such cases and there is no necessity for a full-fledged inquiry at the end of probation period. [Civil Appeal No. 8933-8934/2017 dated 18.03.2020]

(4) Pension available even for employees who have opted for VRS scheme

Deciding the disputed question (on which even the earlier benches of the Supreme Court has a conflicting view), a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India v. Radhey Shyam Pandey has declared that even those employees opted for the Bank's Voluntary Retirement Scheme after 15 years are entitled to pension. The Court specifically concluded that the action of the Bank in denying the benefit of the pension scheme was unfair in this case and it should have considered its social obligation to its past employees as well. [Civil Appeal No. 2463/2015 dated 02.03.2020]

(5) Limitation period for execution of foreign decree has to be adopted from the foreign country

There is no limitation period under the Indian law for execution of a foreign decree. In this background in the case of Bank of Baroda v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. the Supreme Court has concluded that the limitation period for execution of foreign decree in the host country will apply even in India. For example if a decree of UK can be executed in UK only within 6 years, the same decree when sought to be executed in India, can also be executed within 6 years and after that it will be barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that any other limitation period will imply that when the decree cannot be originally executed in its own country, it can still be executed in India, which will be an anamalous situation and cannot be accepted. [Civil Appeal No. 2175/2020 dated 17.03.2020]

(6) 5-judge bench clarifies the law on Land Acquisition

In 2013 a new land acquisition law replaced the earlier law of 1894. This 2013 law made specific provisions was lapse of a land acquisition i.e. situations where land cannot be acquired due to non-completion of conditions within the stipulated period. There were multiple proceedings before various High Courts in the country and also there were many contrary opinions in the Supreme Court itself on when do these conditions get satisfied. A five judge bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal has declared the final position. This is a detailed decision running into over 300 pages with clear set of conclusions towards the end. [SLP(C) No. 9036-9038/2016 dated 06.03.2020]

(7) Same expression can have different meaning under different laws

Can the same term mean differently when used in different laws. The Supreme Court has answered in the affirmative. In the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur v. Universal Ferro & Allied Chemicals Ltd. the Supreme Court considered the provisions of Central Excise Act, 1944 where the expression 'sale' is defined to cover a mere transfer of possession of goods in the course of business. Holding that it was possible for the law-makers to give a different definition which was contrary to the general meaning of the expression and once such a different definition was used, the meaning under this definition was to be applied. In other words, the general meaning of the expression 'sale' was not relevant. [Civil Appeal No. 848-852/2009 dated 06.03.2020] 

(8) Obligation of the vehicle owner for insurance claim purposes

In the case of Nirmala Kothari v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. the Supreme Court has held that it is the obligation of the insured to verify the driving licence of the person to whom the vehicle is being given. If the driving licence looks genuine, that obligation is complete. There is no obligation to take up the matter with the RTO to seek confirmation. In such cases, the Insurance Company has to give the insurance claim and it cannot deny the liability even if the licence later turns out to be forged. [Civil Appeal No. 1999-2000/2020 dated 04.03.2020]

(9) RBI Ban on crypto-currency set aside.

The Supreme Court in the case of Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank of India has quashed the ban imposed by the RBI on crypto-currencies. Taking note of the legal position outside India and the fast changes happening elsewhere, according to the Supreme Court the decision of the RBI was disproportionate and unreasonable making it vulnerable to constitutional stipulations. [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 528/2018 dated 04.03.2020]

(10) Anyone can work as an architect. 

Holding that there is no legal requirement to get registered with Council of Architecture, the Supreme Court in the case of Council of Architecture v. Mukesh Goyal has held that the law only prohibits an unregistered individual from using the title of 'architect'. [Civil Appeal No. 1819/2020 dated 17.03.2020]

Owner on record liable for motor accident even after sale: Supreme Court

Holding that despite the transfer of ownership of vehicle, unless the name of the owner was changed in the registration certification of the vehicle, the former owner continues to be liable to third parties in respect of claims for insurance in motor vehicle accident, the Supreme Court referred to its earlier decisions to hold the former owner liable on account of his name being still on the registration certificate of the vehicle. The Supreme Court held so, considering the question; "Whether in the fact and circumstances of the case the liability to pay the compensation amount as determined by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was of the purchaser of the vehicle alone or whether the liability of the recorded owner of the vehicle was coextensive and from the recorded owner it would pass on to the insurer of the vehicle?"

The Supreme Court in Pushpa @ Leela v. Shakuntala declared the law in the following terms;

11. It is undeniable that notwithstanding the sale of the vehicle neither the transferor Jitender Gupta nor the transferee Salig Ram took any step for the change of the name of the owner in the certificate of registration of the vehicle. In view of this omission Jitender Gupta must be deemed to continue as the owner of the vehicle for the purposes of the Act, even though under the civil law he ceased to be its owner after its sale on February 2, 1993. 

12. The question of the liability of the recorded owner of a vehicle after its sale to another person was considered by this Court in Dr. T.V. Jose vs. Chacko P.M., (2001) 8 SCC 748. In paragraphs 9 and 10 of the decision, the Court observed and held as follows:

“9. Mr. Iyer appearing for the Appellant submitted that the High Court was wrong in ignoring the oral evidence on record. He submitted that the oral evidence clearly showed that the Appellant was not the owner of the car on the date of the accident. Mr. Iyer submitted that merely because the name had not been changed in the records of R.T.O. did not mean that the ownership of the vehicle had not been transferred. Mr. Iyer submitted that the real owner of the car was Mr. Roy Thomas. Mr. Iyer submitted that Mr. Roy Thomas had been made party-Respondent No.9 to these Appeals. He pointed out that an Advocate had filed appearance on behalf of Mr. Roy Thomas but had then applied for and was permitted to withdraw the appearance. He pointed out that Mr. Roy Thomas had been duly served and a public notice had also been issued. He pointed out that Mr. Roy Thomas had chosen not to appear in these Appeals. He submitted that the liability, if any, was of Mr. Roy Thomas.

10. We agree with Mr. Iyer that the High Court was not right in holding that the Appellant continued to be the owner as the name had not been changed in the records of R.T.O. There can be transfer of title by payment of consideration and delivery of the car. The evidence on record shows that ownership of the car had been transferred. However the Appellant still continued to remain liable to third parties as his name continued in the records of R.T.O. as the owner. The Appellant could not escape that liability by merely joining Mr. Roy Thomas in these Appeals. Mr. Roy Thomas was not a party either before MACT or the High Court. In these Appeals we cannot and will not go into the question of inter se liability between the Appellant and Mr. Roy Thomas. It will be for the Appellant to adopt appropriate proceedings against Mr. Roy Thomas if, in law, he is entitled to do so.” 

13. Again, in P.P. Mohammed vs. K. Rajappan & Ors., (2008) 17 SCC 624, this Court examined the same issue under somewhat similar set of facts as in the present case. In paragraph 4 of the decision, this Court observed and held as follows:

“4. These appeals are filed by the appellants. The insurance company has chosen not to file any appeal. The question before this Court is whether by reason of the fact that the vehicle has been transferred to Respondent 4 and thereafter to Respondent 5, the appellant got absolved from liability to the third person who was injured. This question has been answered by this Court in T.V. Jose (Dr.) v. Chacko P.M. wherein it is held that even though in law there would be a transfer of ownership of the vehicle, that, by itself, would not absolve the party, in whose name the vehicle stands in RTO records, from liability to a third person. We are in agreement with the view expressed therein. Merely because the vehicle was transferred does not mean that the appellant stands absolved of his liability to a third person. So long as his name continues in RTO records, he remains liable to a third person.”

14. The decision in Dr. T.V. Jose was rendered under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. But having regard to the provisions of section 2(30) and section 50 of the Act, as noted above, the ratio of the decision shall apply with equal force to the facts of the case arising under the 1988 Act. On the basis of these decisions, the inescapable conclusion is that Jitender Gupta, whose name continued in the records of the registering authority as the owner of the truck was equally liable for payment of the compensation amount. Further, since an insurance policy in respect of the truck was taken out in his name he was indemnified and the claim will be shifted to the insurer, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.

15. Learned counsel for the insurance company submitted that even though the registered owner of the vehicle was Jitender Gupta, after the sale of the truck he had no control over it and the possession and control of the truck were in the hands of the transferee, Salig Ram. No liability can, therefore, be fastened on Jitender Gupta, the transferor of the truck. In support of this submission he relied upon a decision of this Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Deepa Devi & Ors., (2008) 1 SCC 414. The facts of the case in Deepa Devi are entirely different. In that case the vehicle was requisitioned by the District Magistrate in exercise of the powers conferred upon him under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In that circumstance, this Court observed that the owner of the vehicle cannot refuse to abide by the order of requisition of the vehicle by the Deputy Commissioner. While the vehicle remained under requisition, the owner did not exercise any control over it: the driver might still be the employee of the owner of the vehicle but he had to drive the vehicle according to the direction of the officer of the State, in whose charge the vehicle was given. Save and except the legal ownership, the registered owner of the vehicle had lost all control over the vehicle. The decision in Deepa Devi was rendered on the special facts of that case and it has no application to the facts of the case in hand. 

Have a look at the decision.

Liability of insurer limited to policy: High Court

As a part of social welfare legislation, the Motor Vehicle Act obliges the insuror to pay the amount of compensation to the victim of a motor vehicle accident. However the question as to the extent of this liability of the insurer is always a vexed question. In a recently reported decision [The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Chameli Devi, AIR 2010 PH 156] the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court declared the law to this effect inter alia as under;

The Reference was made to the Larger Bench primarily for the reason that the comprehensive policy makes the Insurance Company liable for the unlimited liability as it is liable to satisfy the entire awarded amount. However, the question whether the comprehensive policy leads to unlimited liability of the Insurance Company to satisfy an award, stands decided by the Constitution Bench in C.M. Jaya’s case (supra), wherein it has been held to the following effect:-

“8. Thus, a careful reading of these decisions clearly shows that the liability of the insurer is limited, as indicated in Section 95 of the Act, but it is open to the insured to make payment of additional higher premium and get higher risk covered in respect of third party also. But in the absence of any such clause in the insurance policy the liability of the insurer cannot be unlimited in respect of third party and it is limited only to the statutory liability. This view has been consistently taken in the other decisions of this Court.

9. In Shanti Bai case, a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court, following the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jugal Kishore, (1988)1 SCC 626, has held that:-

(i) a comprehensive policy which has been issued on the basis of the estimated value of the vehicle does not automatically result in covering the liability with regard to third-party risk for an amount higher than the statutory limit, 

(ii) that even though it is not permissible to use a vehicle unless it is covered at least under an “Act only” policy, it is not obligatory for the owner of a vehicle to get it comprehensively insured, and 

(iii) that the limit of liability with regard to third party risk does not become unlimited or higher than the statutory liability in the absence of specific agreement to make the insurer’s liability unlimited or higher than the statutory liability.

10. On a careful reading and analysis of the decision in Amrit Lal Sood v. Kaushalya Devi Thapar, (1998)3 SCC 744, it is clear that the view taken by the Court is no different. In this decision also, the case of Jugal Kishore is referred to. It is held:-

(i) that the liability of the insurer depends on the terms of the contract between the insured and the insurer contained in the policy; 

(ii) there is no prohibition for an insured from entering into a contract of insurance covering a risk wider than the minimum requirement of the statute whereby risk to the gratuitous passenger could also be covered; and

(iii) in such cases where the policy is not merely statutory policy, the terms of the policy have to be considered the liability of the insurer.” 

In view of the aforesaid judgment, we are of the opinion that mere fact that the insured has taken a comprehensive policy, does not lead to an inference that the Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the insured of the entire awarded amount including the amount in excess of the statutory liability.

Have a look at the decision.

Insurance coverage not changeable mid-way: High Court

Providing a major relief to the insured and holding against the insurance companies, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a recently reported decision [T. Suresh v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 2010 AP 86] has declared that once a policy has been taken by a person and continuously renewed without lapse, then the terms and coverage of the policy cannot be changed mid-way to the prejudice of the policy holder. The High Court was dealing with a challenge to the denial of insurance claim by the policy holder wherein the insurance company denied the liability on the ground that the coverage of the policy has been changed.

The High Court, dismissing the contention of the coverage being allowed to the changed mid-way, declared the law in the following terms;

6. The petitioner took out the Medi-Claim Policy, way back in the year 2002. It is rather unfortunate that a disease, which had a severe impact on the individual for the rest of his life, has occurred to the petitioner. Expenditure had to be incurred, not only for conducting operation to the kidneys, but also for the Dialysis, which is almost a routine. The existence of policy for the petitioner provided financial relief, though his suffering remain. The respondents discharged their obligation under the policy by reimbursing the cost incurred by the petitioner towards treatment, be it for Dialysis or medicines. It is only for the year 2008, that they refused to honour the claim of the petitioner on the ground that it was excluded from the list, with effect from the year 2008.

7. It is no doubt true that the duration of the coverage under the policy is one year. Clause 2.18 of the policy makes this very clear. However, Clause 3 of the policy, dealing with the renewal, confers a right on the policyholder to seek renewal on payment of the premium. The clause reads as under. 

3. Renewal of Policy:
Company shall not be responsible or liable for non-renewal of policy due to non-receipt or delayed receipt (i.e. After the due date) of the proposal form or of the medical practitioners report wherever required or due to any other reason whatsoever. Standing this, however, the decision to accept or reject for coverage any person upon renewal of this insurance shall rest solely with the Company. The company may as its discretion revise the premium rates and/or the terms & conditions of the policy every year upon renewal thereof. Renewal of this policy is not automatic; premium due must be paid by the proposer to the company before the due date. Company normally sends renewal notice, but not sending it will not tantamount to deficiency in service.

8. The very first sentence gives an indication that in case the premium is paid without delay, renewal becomes a matter of course. It is not alleged that the petitioner delayed the payment of premium at any point of time. Once the policy was taken and it is being renewed from time to time, it virtually becomes a continuous phenomenon, and any changes as to the coverage that takes place in between, would not apply to the policyholder. The change, as regards coverage may apply to those persons who take out a policy for the first time or where, their existing policy is elapsed and a necessity has arisen to take out a fresh policy, after it.

9. A Division Bench of High Court of Gujarat dealt with similar terms, as to renewal of policy was taken into account. It was held that the intermittent changes, as to coverage, do not apply, if the renewal of the policy is without any break. The conclusions of the Bench were summed up in Para 38 and they read as under.

The insured has an option under the existing mediclaim insurance policy to continue the cover by payment of renewal premium in time in respect of the sum insured In case of renewal without break in the period, the mediclaim insurance policy will be renewed without excluding any disease already covered under the existing policy which may have been contracted during the period of the expiring policy. Renewal of mediclaim insurance policy cannot be refused on the ground that the insured had contracted disease during the period of the expiring policy so far as the basic sum insured under the existing policy is concerned.

Have a look at the decision.

Recovered stolen vehicles to be returned to the insurer: Supreme Court

Noting that stolen vehicles were not being handed over to the insurance companies after being recovered by the Police, the Supreme Court in a recent decision has issued directions to all the police authorities in the country directing them to inform the insurance company of the recovery of the stolen vehicle. The Court apparently was moved by the fact that recovered vehicles languished within the premises of the police-stations, degrading and even being stolen in the appalling conditions, thus leading to a waste of national wealth.

The Court observed inter alia as under;

13. Petitioners have submitted that information with regard to all insured vehicles in the country is available with the Insurance Information Bureau created by IRDA. This information could be utilised to assist the police to identify the insurer of the vehicle. Upon recovery of the vehicle in police station, insurer/ complainant can call an All India Toll Free No. to be provided by Insurance Information Bureau to give the information of the recovered vehicle. Thereafter, the insured vehicle database would be searched to identify the respective insurer. Upon such identification, this information can be communicated to the respective insurer and concerned police stations for necessary coordination.

14. In our considered opinion, the aforesaid information is required to be utilised and followed scrupulously and has to be given positively as and when asked for by the Insurer. We also feel, it is necessary that in addition to the directions issued by this Court in Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai (supra) considering the mandate of Section 451 read with Section 457 of the Code, the following further directions with regard to seized vehicles are required to be given.

“(A) Insurer may be permitted to move a separate application for release of the recovered vehicle as soon as it is informed of such recovery before the Jurisdictional Court. Ordinarily, release shall be made within a period of 30 days from the date of the application. The necessary photographs may be taken duly authenticated and certified, and a detailed panchnama may be prepared before such release.

(B) The photographs so taken may be used as secondary evidence during trial. Hence, physical production of the vehicle may be dispensed with. 

(C) Insurer would submit an undertaking/guarantee to remit the proceeds from the sale/auction of the vehicle conducted by the Insurance Company in the event that the Magistrate finally adjudicates that the rightful ownership of the vehicle does not vest with the insurer. The undertaking/guarantee would be furnished at the time of release of the vehicle, pursuant to the applcation for release of the recovered vehicle. Insistence on personal bonds may be dispensed with looking to the corporate structure of the insurer.”

15. It is a matter of common knowledge that as and when vehicles are seized and kept in various police stations, not only they occupy substantial space of the police stations but upon being kept in open, are also prone to fast natural decay on account of weather conditions. Even a good maintained vehicle loses its road worthiness if it is kept stationary in the police station for more than fifteen days. Apart from the above, it is also a matter of common knowledge that several valuable and costly parts of the said vehicles are either stolen or are cannibalised so that the vehicles become unworthy of being driven on road. To avoid all this, apart from the aforesaid directions issued hereinabove, we direct that all the State Governments/ Union Territories/Director Generals of Police shall ensure macro implementation of the statutory provisions and further direct that the activities of each and every police stations, especially with regard to disposal of the seized vehicles be taken care of by the Inspector General of Police of the concerned Division/Commissioner of Police of the concerned cities/ Superintendent of Police of the concerned district. 

16. In case any non-compliance is reported either by the Petitioners or by any of the aggrieved party, then needless to say, we would be constrained to take a serious view of the matter against an erring officer who would be dealt with iron hands.

Have a look at the decision.

ULIP Ordinance: The legal dimensions analysed

We had promised our readers in our last update that we would be penning our thoughts on the legal dimensions of the ULIP ordinance as soon as we got our hands on it. Now that we have with us the legal text of the Securities and Insurance Laws (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 2010 promulgated by the President of India, furthering the quest of analyzing the legal perspectives as we always do on this blog, we carry forward that task on the the Ordinance No. 3 of 2010. In as much as on this blog we had analysed extensive the origin and the issued involved in the tussle between SEBI and IRDA on ULIPS in our earlier post we would desist from undertaking the exercise again except as and when required when we specifically cover that in this post.  

Ordinances understood

First and foremost, for the benefit of our readers, 'what is an Ordinance'. Legally speaking, in terms of Article 79 of the Constitution, the Parliament comprises of not just the two Houses (i.e. the Council of States or the Rajya Sabha and the House of People or the Lok Sabha) but also the President of India. These three institutions are the legislative organ of the Union. Thus the responsibilities of legislating for the country lies with these three collectively. Ordinarily it is the two houses which take up this task in as much as bills are presented before them, discussed/debate, voted and approved and upon the assent of the President, these bills become enactments or the law. However this does not imply that the President is devoid of such legislative powers. 

In order to deal with contingencies which arises in the event when the Houses of Parliament are not in session and the situation requires for a Parliamentary law, the Constitution confers power on the President to act on his own volition where in terms of Article 123 of the Constitution the President can promulgate an Ordinance. The Constitutional provision stipulates that "if at any time, except when both Houses of Parliament are in session, the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances may appear to him to require". Thus the absolute prerogative vests with the President in this regard. There are, however, two notes points to be covered in this regard.

First, the President performs a different role when issuing an ordinance than in the capacity of giving assent to this bill. While the satisfaction of the President to give assent to the bills presented to him after due passage by the Parliament is the personal satisfaction of the President, the role is different in regard to promulgation of Ordinance. The President while issuing an Ordinance is bound by the advice of the Cabinet led by the Prime Minister in this regard. We have already examined the law in regard to the President being bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers in our earlier post and therefore will abstain from speaking more on this.

Second, the power of promulgation of Ordinance, as held by the Supreme Court, while is an extraordinary power vested with the President, nonetheless is not beyond the purview of judicial review and the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in A.K. Roy v. Union of India [AIR 1982 SC 710] declares that the judiciary can scrutinize the validity of the Ordinance issuing process. 

Having noted this, it is also important to remember that the life of an Ordinance can at the maximum be six weeks after the Parliament is in session. Therefore the Ordinance must be followed by a bill and enacted into an Act within six weeks of the re-sitting of the Parliament after the issuance of the Ordinance. If the Government fails to ensure the same, the Ordinance lapses. With this background now let us examine in greater detail the impact of the recent Ordinance.

Understanding the Ordinance dated 18.06.2010

A whole-time member of SEBI had issued an Order on 9th April, 2010 concluding that Unit-Linked-Insurance-Products (ULIPs) "offered by the said entities are a combination of investment and insurance and, therefore, the investment components are in the nature of mutual funds which can only be offered/launched after obtaining registration from SEBI". For this reason, and the companies having issued ULIPs without registration with SEBI, directed those companies "not to issue any offer document, advertisement, brochure soliciting money from investors or raise money from investors by way of new and/or additional subscription for any product (including ULIPs) having an investment component in the nature of mutual funds, till they obtain the requisite certificate of registration from SEBI". The order was made in terms of the SEBI Act, 1992 whereunder the SEBI Member was of the view that he had the jurisdiction to decide so despite the objections of IRDA to this regard. This is the very first issue sought to be addressed by the Ordinance. 

This issue, however is not a simple one. First the respective powers and jurisdictions of the various market regulators involved required to be defined and that too in a manner that their jurisdiction is defined exclusive to each other, otherwise the issue of the same subject-matter being sought to be regulated by the two or more regulators would arise again. In this regard the Ordinance seems to have introduced a new feature namely the "Joint Mechanism" wherein under the issues relating to the jurisdiction between the regulators, being not just SEBI and IRDA but also including RBI, PFRDA, such issues are (instead of each regulator taking action in exercise of its powers) to be raised and reconciled by the Joint Committee which shall comprise of the Minister of Finance, Government of India and Secretary to his Ministry besides the Chairman of the respective regulatory bodies. Thus the jurisdictional issues shall now be addressed at an administrative level rather than through the exercise of quasi-judicial powers. 

In this context it is crucial to note that the Ordinance provides that "the decision of the Joint Committee shall be binding on the Reserve Bank of India, the Securities and Exchange Board of India, the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority and the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority". Thus the decision of an administrative body has been given statutory force. In as much as this provision is being inserted into an existing law (namely the RBI Act) and also that it has been clothed in a non-obstante clause, it shall override any other contrary provision under any other law, it would now not be open to the regulators to go ahead and act contrary to the Ministry's instructions. Thus its not just for SEBI or IRDA but the Government has gone ahead to ensure that no such jurisdictional tussles do not take place in full public view in future.

The second and more immediate change made in the Ordinance is the extension of the jurisdiction of IRDA as contrary to what was sought to be argued by SEBI as falling within its own ambit. Even earlier there was no doubt that the jurisdiction in respect of 'life insurance' products was exclusive to IRDA. Now the definition of 'life insurance products' has been extended to  "include any unit linked insurance policy or scrips or any such instrument or unit, by whatever name called, which provides a component of investment and a component of insurance issued by an insurer" while simultaneously excluding them from within the definition of 'securities' such that SEBI shall not be able to bring them within its fold. 

On another interesting note, the Ordinance has been backdated i.e. even though it has received the Presidential assent on 18th June, 2010, retrospective effect has been given to the Ordinance from 9th April, 2010 which significantly is the same date on which the SEBI passed the critical order. Further, in order to wriggle out the insurance companies from the order of SEBI, the validation provision in Section 6 of the Ordinance overcomes the SEBI order by declaring that the "any unit linked insurance policy or scrips or any such instrument or unit, by whatever name called, issued or purported to have been issued at any time before the 9th day of April, 2010, shall be deemed and always deemed to have been validly issued and shall not be called in question in any court of law or other authority solely on the ground that it was issued without a certificate of registration under any law for the time being in force or without following any procedure under any law for the time being in force, by an insurer or any other person". 

Having understood the Ordinance, let us now examine the validity of the Ordinance.

Examining the validity of the Ordinance

Having had a look at the Ordinance, one must say that it is indeed an almost flawless piece of legislation in as much as it leaves little scope for challenge. By amending the provisions of the law under which the respective regulators have been established and by clothing the Joint Committee as a statutory body, its institution can hardly be challenged as being contrary to the statutory provisions of other laws or seeking to undermine the laws in force in India. By the amendment carried out by this Ordinance, the Joint Committee and the Joint Mechanism have come on equal footing as any of the regulators and given the provision of its decision being binding on all regulators, the decision of the Joint Committee are legally binding on all regulators. Its decisions would undoubtedly still be within the purview of judicial review (in terms of the constitutional powers vested in the High Courts and the Supreme Court) but then the grounds of challenge being very limited therein, the Joint Mechanism feature seems to be an efficient and legally sustainable mechanism for resolution of jurisdictional issues between the regulators. 

As far as the need for issuance of Ordinance is concerned, the scope of judicial review is already very limited. Nonetheless given the fact that crores of rupees of the innocent investors was at stake, the market was behaving erratically given the contradictory orders being passed by two regulators and the fact that each day of business loss is not only costing the insurance companies in the lime-lights but also the investors and more importantly the Government's business, one can only call the decision behind issuance of Ordinance as prudent such that an appropriate law can be enacted by the Parliament thus giving permanence to the provisions sought to be introduced by the Parliament. 

An effective restraint on the power of the President to issue the Ordinance is that the subject-matter on which the Ordinance has been passed must be one on which the Parliament can make laws. This takes us to the Schedule VII of the Constitution which delineates the power between the Parliament and State Legislatures. A bare perusal of the three lists in the said Schedule would quickly reveal that the Parliament indeed has the power to make laws on the issue in as much as legislative subjects such as 'banking', 'insurance', 'stock exchanges and futures markets', 'reserve bank of India' vest with the Parliament, which in any case is entrusted with the legislative function in respect of all residuary subjects as well. 

As far as the backdating of the Ordinance is concerned, it is well settled in the Indian jurisprudence that if a legislative body has the power to make law, it has the power to make law with retrospective effect. Thus if the Ordinance is successfully defended as being within the realm of the powers vested in the Parliament and thus exercisable by the President, the challenge to the Ordinance only on the ground of backdating would not be able to further the cause of the challenge. 

In as much as legislative overruling of the SEBI order is concerned, the law in regard to the validity of 'validation statutes' states that if the law-makers change the very basis on which the decision had been rendered, then the overruling of the judicial dictum and subsequent validation of the new law is permissible. Through such means the law-makers can not only validate an action contrary to an order of a quasi-judicial body but also overturn the decision of the Supreme Court and the Indian constitutional jurisprudence is replete with such instances. Thus the only aspect to be examined is whether the very basis on which the SEBI passed the order in eroded away or not. The answer to this is clear. 

The whole-time member of SEBI took into account the provisions of the SEBI Act, Securities Contract Regulation Act and the IRDA Act, all three of which stand amended to the effect that ULIPs and other similar insurance products are not covered within the definition of 'securities' but are instead a part and parcel of 'life insurance' products, then deleting the very basis on which the SEBI order was passed. Further the aspect of having given retrospective operation to the Ordinance implies that legally it would be presumed that the amended provisions as introduced by the Ordinance were in place at all times and thus the very basis (i.e. the statutory provisions) which were examined by the SEBI to find giving jurisdiction to SEBI over ULIPs never existed and thus the SEBI order is now without legal basis looking elsewhere for its sustainence. 

As far as the propriety of the Governmental action in issuing the Ordinance, considering the matter was sub-judice and that the Government had already filed its affidavit before the Supreme Court, again that is a ground on which we as commentators are not in a position to reflect but it is the Court itself which can take a view on the propriety. Technically speaking, sub-judice or not, the power to legislative cannot be curbed for any reason. Such incidents are again frequent in Indian legal diaspora and very rarely such instances have been called into question on such ground of propriety. Further, in as much as the courts are equipped to take judicial notice of facts subsequent to the origin of the litigation, the Supreme Court may well decline to exercise its jurisdiction of going into the merits of the matter in the wake of the Ordinance for it is equally well settled that the Courts in India do not decide over matters which have been rendered academic.

We may also leave it to our readers and lawyers who make like to take up this matter that it may well be a case that the amendment called into question may be challenged on the ground that the definition of 'life insurance' products, as amended by the Ordinance, does not quiet fit well with the introduction of ULIPs into the definition. However how and with what effectiveness such a ground may be sustained is for experts in Insurance to bring out the incompatibility and press thereon.  

However, in as much as the effect of SEBI order is in question, the law to this regard is well settled. We already wrote about it earlier and would be pleased to reiterate that any order, howsoever illegal, incorrect or without jurisdiction would be alive and kicking unless set aside in a matter known to law. Thus it would require a pronouncement from a competent court setting aside the SEBI order and unless such happens, the order would be legally binding. It is a different matter, however, that given the factual aspect relating to the introduction of the Ordinance and the legal aspect of the changes brought therein, very less remains to be said and done in compliance with the said order except wait for a formal pronouncement to that effect, in the wake of the Ordinance. 

We are slightly disappointed in which the issue has been given a burial in as much as we had been expecting fire-works in the Supreme Court when this matter was being argued. But better have a simpler solution rather than prolong the agony of the innocent investors. We will, as usual, in any case keep our readers posted of the subsequent developments. It would also be worthwhile to note that how quickly Parliament adopts the Ordinance for one may recall that it is only six weeks that the Ordinance has got to be approved for fade away into oblivion.

Fees on assignment of insurance policy illegal: High Court

In a recent decision the Bombay High Court has declared the fees of Rs. 250/- collected by the Life Insurance Corporation of India on assignment of insurance policies in favour of finance companies to be illegal being ultra vires their powers. The High Court quashed the Circular in terms of which the fees was being collected being of the view that there was no power vested in LIC, in terms of the LIC Act or otherwise, to collected fees of such nature and thus there was no legal justification for collection of such fees which was being charged under the garb of 'service charges'.

Holding such, the High Court inter alia observed as under;

33. In Sri Krishna Das vs. Town Area Committee, Cirgaon (supra), the Supreme Court posed the question as under :- 

“The question to be determined is whether the power to levy the tax or fee is conferred on that authority and if it falls beyond, to declare it ultra vires.”

The Court then noted that the power of the State under the Constitution to levy a fee is not identical with its power to levy a tax. The power to levy fees is co-extensive with the power to legislate with respect to substantive matters and it may levy a fee with reference to the services that will be rendered by the State under such law. The State may delegate such a power to a local authority.

34. From Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority vs. Sharadkumar J.Pasawalla & Ors. (supra), we may refer the following extracts from paras 7 & 8 which read as under :-

“7. After giving our anxious consideration to the contentions raised by Mr. Goswami, it appears to us that in a fiscal matter it will not be proper to hold that even in the absence of express provision, a delegated authority can impose tax or fee. In our view, such power of imposition of tax and/or fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope of implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. It appears to us that the delegated authority must act strictly within the parameters of the authority delegated to it under Act and it will not be proper to bring the theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal power.”

“8.....It has been consistently held by this Court that whenever there is compulsory exaction of any money, there should be specific provision for the same and there is no room for intendment. Nothing is to be read and nothing is to be implied and one should look fairly to the language used.”

35. In Gupta Modern Breweries vs. State of J & K (supra), the Supreme Court observed as under :-

“It is now well settled principle of law that the regulatory powers are generally to be widely construed. However, empowering the State Government to impose taxes, fees or duties and such demands must be authorised by the Statute and must contain sufficient guidelines.”

36. It would, thus, be clear that there must be a specific provision conferred by the Act on the delegate to levy a fee. We do not find that the power to make rules under the LIC Act as also the Insurance Act, 1938 is conferred on the Respondent-Corporation. Under the LIC Act, the power to make rules is conferred on the Central Government while the power to make regulations is conferred on the Corporation with the previous approval of the Central Government. The power to charge fee is specifically conferred on the Central Government by making rules. Under the Insurance Act, the power to make rules is conferred on the Central Government and under Section 114-A, the power to make regulations is conferred on the authority. “Authority” has been defined to mean “the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority” established under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Insurance Regulatory and Development authority Act. The impugned circular therefore issued by the Corporation is neither based on the provisions of the LIC Act nor the Insurance Act. As consistently observed by the Supreme Court, it is not possible to read the concept of incidental and ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal power. There is no scope of implied authority for imposition of a fee. The fee must be authorised by the statute and the exercise of the power must be governed by sufficient guidelines. In the instant case, we do not find that the impugned circular has been issued pursuant to the express power conferred on the Corporation. We have already explained Section 6 of the Insurance Act. In that context, the impugned circular would clearly be violative of both the provisions of the Insurance Act as also the LIC Act. The service charge/fee is ultra vires both the abovementioned Acts.

37. Once a service charge/fee is imposed without the authority of law, it affects the petitioners’/ right to carry on business under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India. It may be possible to contend that the respondents are entitled to defray expenses required to meet the cost of the service to be rendered, but such recovery could be made only if it was authorised by law. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the service charge/fee is not authorised by law. The demand is in contravention of the petitioners’ fundamental right to carry on trade and business and therefore violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Consequently, as the demand is without authority of law, it infringes also Article 300(A) of the Constitution of India.

 Have a look at the decision.

Insurance company cannot deny liability on fault of insured: Supreme Court

Holding that even if the insured had committed a breach of the policy it is not open to the insurance company to deny the liability all together, the Supreme Court in a recently pronounced decision held the insurance company liable for 75% of the claim even when the vehicle (which was insured for personal use) met with an accident when being used for hire and not for personal use. 

The Court rejected the submissions of the insurance company in the following terms;

10. It is not in dispute that the appellant has taken a comprehensive insurance policy nor is it in dispute that the accident took place during the subsistence of the policy. The policy was, therefore, valid on the date of the accident. 

11. What is disputed by the insurance company is that the vehicle was not used for personal use but was used by way of being hired, though no payment for hiring charges was proved. However, according to the insurance company, by using the vehicle on hire, the appellant had violated the terms of the insurance policy and on that basis the insurance company was within its right to repudiate the claim.

12. Reference in this case may be made to the decision of National Commission rendered in the case of United India Insurance Company Limited v. Gian Singh reported in 2006 CTJ 221 (CP) (NCDRC). In that decision of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) it has been held that in a case of violation of condition of the policy as to the nature of use of the vehicle, the claim ought to be settled on a non-standard basis. The said decision of the National Commission has been referred to by this Court in the case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Nitin Khandelwal reported in 2008 (7) SCALE 351. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, in the case of Nitin Khandelwal (supra) this Court held:-

“..The appellant Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the owner of the vehicle when the insurer has obtained comprehensive policy for the loss caused to the insurer. The respondent submitted that even assuming that there was a breach of condition of the insurance policy, the appellant Insurance Company ought to have settled the claim on nonstandard basis.” 

13. In the case of Nitin Khandelwal (supra) the State Commission allowed 75% of the claim of the claimant on non-standard basis. The said order was upheld by the National Commission and this Court refused to interfere with the decision of the National Commission.

14. In this connection reference may be made to a decision of National Commission in the case of New India Assurance Company Limited v. Narayan Prasad Appaprasad Pathak reported in (2006) CPJ 144 (NC). In that case also the question was, whether the insurance company can repudiate the claims in a case where the vehicle carrying passengers and the driver did not have a proper driving licence and met with an accident. While granting claim on non-standard basis the National Commission set out in its judgment the guidelines issued by the insurance company about settling all such non-standard claims. The said guidelines are set out below:-

15. From a perusal of the aforesaid guidelines it is clear that one of the cases where 75% claim of the admissible claim was settled was where condition of policy including limitation as to use was breached. 

16. In the instant case the entire stand of the insurance company is that claimant has used the vehicle for hire and in the course of that there has been an accident. Following the aforesaid guidelines, this Court is of the opinion that the insurance company cannot repudiate the claim in toto.

Have a look at the decision.

SEBI v. IRDA: Exploring the tussle between regulators over ULIPs

The issue which we cover in this post is an interesting one. Two regulators have taken contrary stands and the issue of Unit Linked Insurance Plans (ULIPs) has in fact brought the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the securities market regulator of India and the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) at logger-heads in much as their respective jurisdiction and exercise of powers of concerned. Since legal issues are involved, we seek leave to bring to the attention of our readers the stakes involved and the potential fallouts of this tussle. 

First the facts: A whole-time member of SEBI, exercising powers under Section 11, 11B  and 12(1B) of the SEBI Act, 1992 has issued an order restraining fourteen (14) insurance companies from issuing "any offer document, advertisement, brochure soliciting money from investors or raise money from investors by way of new and/or additional subscription for any product (including ULIPs) having an investment component in the nature of mutual funds, till they obtain the requisite certificate of registration from SEBI." This order has been passed as in the considered view of SEBI the ULIPs launched by these companies were "found to be akin to the mutual fund schemes and were launched without obtaining registration" from SEBI whereas one of the functions SEBI as a market-regular is required to perform in terms of the SEBI Act is the "registering and regulating the working of collective investment schemes including mutual funds" towards which regard the "Securities and Exchange Board of India (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996" and "Securities and Exchange Board of India (Collective Investment Scheme) Regulations, 1999" have been framed in terms of which inter alia "“no person can sponsor or cause to be sponsored a collective investment scheme including a mutual fund unless he has been registered with SEBI under the SEBI Act." Thus according to SEBI these companies were in violation of the SEBI Act and regulations by launching and continuing with the ULIPs without being registered with SEBI and following its Regulations.

So what is the rub? Aren't all companies dealing with securities and mutual funds in India registered with SEBI and following its Regulations? Why are the insurance companies so special that they are not required to follow these Regulations? And most importantly, what brings IRDA in picture?

The answer to these questions lies in another Parliamentary enactment and the role of another market-regulators. The Insurance Regulatory and Development Act, 1999, which has constituted the office of IRDA and prescribes (vide Section 14) the powers, functions and duties of IRDA lays down that the IRDA "shall have the duty to regulate, promote and ensure orderly growth of the insurance business and re-insurance business" and in fact various other specific functions and duties have been prescribed by IRDA in this regard under the Act of 1999. Thus, in as much as IRDA is concerned, the sole dominion over insurance companies vests in IRDA and thus comes the rub when SEBI exercises jurisdiction over the insurance companies. 

IRDA has come on record to state that it had specifically "intimated to SEBI that the ULIPs are insurance products marketed by the companies licensed by the IRDA and each of the ULIPs and the conditions thereto are specifically cleared by the IRDA having regard to the Insurance Act and the Regulations issued thereunder and that consequently, the action of SEBI is wholly misconceived and without jurisdiction." Further, the IRDA is also concerned that if the order of SEBI is given effect to, it shall "cause the stoppage of all renewals of insurance policies already invested by the insuring public, may result in the forced premature surrender of insurance policies causing substantial loss to the policyholder and to the insurers.  The effective stoppage of the sale of the said products will cause a complete drying up of the revenue flows to the insurance companies which could disrupt the payment of benefits on maturity, on death and on other admissible claims, putting the policyholder and the general public to irreparable financial loss.  The financial position of the insurers will be seriously jeopardized thus destabilizing the market and upsetting financial stability."

Thus the IRDA has directed, exercising powers under the IRDA Act has directed all the 14 insurance companies which are mentioned in the order of SEBI "to note that notwithstanding the said Order of the SEBI, they shall continue to carry out insurance business as usual including offering, marketing and servicing ULIPs in accordance with the Insurance Act, 1938, Rules, Regulations and Guidelines issued thereunder by the IRDA" which the market calls as IRDA having overruled SEBI and this is where it props up interesting legal issues.

Issues Summarized: Before we deal with the possible legal outcomes, we thought it wiser to cull out the legal issues which are involved in these orders of the two regulators so as to have a clear understanding of the issues.

(1) What are those 14 insurance companies, in the line of fire, required to do? To follow the SEBI order and stop business or to follow IRDA order and continue business in ULIPs?

(2) What is the recourse available to either SEBI or IRDA if the insurance companies defy either of their orders? Will legal sanctions follow the insurance companies in case of their failure to meet out either of the orders?

(3) What happens to investors in these ULIPs? What is the legal status of the policies purchased/renewed by them after the SEBI order?

Examining the legal position: Here we examine the legal position on all of the three issues independently. However, even before we begin, we would like to put a caveat that in all fairness to both SEBI and IRDA, we will not comment upon the correctness of the orders passed by them. That is a issue which is required to be resolved through Good Offices or whatever legal means the regulators or the stake-holders may desire to choose. Here we are examining only the implications and fall outs over the contradictory stands adopted by the two regulators.

(1) and (2) A quick look at the SEBI Act will tell us that the power of SEBI are indeed very wide. The statement of objects and reasons of the Act tells us that SEBI has been instituted being envisioned as "a Board to protect the interests of investors in securities and to promote the development of, and to regulate, the securities market and for matters connected therewith", a mandate which has actually be restated in Section 11(1) of the Act, thus making it an obligatory duty requiring SEBI to ensure that the interests of the investors are protected. Thus, generally, the SEBI does have power to require the entities dealing in securities and ensure that they meeting out the specifications listed in the Regulations prescribed by SEBI. These aspects have been upheld time and again even by the highest courts of the country. Therefore it is clear that the SEBI, in the preliminary, has the power to examine as to whether the role of entities doing business in India fits within the regulatory set-up administered by it. This logically points to the fact that SEBI, given the wide powers it is conferred with, can take action against defaulters for failing to meet its Regulations, which seems to have been done through the order passed by the Whole-Time member of SEBI.

Further, it is a well settled rule of common law that an order, no matter how perverse and illegal and one even without jurisdiction is binding over the subject unless set-aside in a manner known to law. In the present case, even assuming that the SEBI order is incorrect or as the IRDA puts it, without jurisdiction to begin with. However, given the legal set-up in which the rule of law operates in India, the fourteen insurance companies cannot sit over the order grossly violating its terms without getting it set aside. In the present case the only remedy available to them is to file an appeal against the order before the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) or even a direct petition of special leave before the Supreme Court (under Article 136 of the Constitution) or a writ petition before the High Court challenge the order on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, illegality or otherwise. 

In the event the Insurance Companies violate the order of SEBI, the logical fallouts would be that SEBI will be constrained to take action (being a creature of statute, it is required and bound to follow the mandate of the Act and bring to book the defaulters of its orders) and pass necessary orders against these companies for having failed to carry out its order and continuing business. As far as the IRDA goes, it may have the jurisdiction to regulate and monitor insurance companies. However it does not have the powers to poke its nose and sit over judgment over the orders passed by SEBI. All it can do is represent the insurance companies before appropriate forum and carry their grievances further. It neither has the power nor the authority to over-rule a decision passed by a quasi-judicial authority in exercise of powers conferred by a Parliamentary statute. 

However, in as much as the IRDA has already passed orders directing these companies to continue doing business and in terms of the IRDA Act such powers are indeed vested in the IRDA, this brings the insurance companies in a catch 22 position. They are required by the SEBI order to desist from their business whereas the IRDA order directs them to continue doing the business as usual. So what if these companies decide to follow SEBI order and ignore the one passed by IRDA? Given the IRDA Act, they can be taken action against by IRDA, in which scenario they would be required to approach the appropriate forum to challenge such orders of IRDA. Either way, they are bound to face regulatory action from either SEBI or IRDA, depending upon which order they decide to follow.

Thus, as a matter of advice to these companies, the only optimal solution would seek that they approach the appropriate legal forum against the SEBI order and ventilate their grievances against it to get it diluted or set-aside. In which case, till the time the appeal/petition against the SEBI order is pending, the matter being sub-judice, IRDA would oblige by not taking any action against these companies. However, glossing over the SEBI order without challenging its legality can only cost the company in multitudes given the rule of law in the country that an order becomes final and binding if not appealed against or set-aside by an appropriate forum.

(3) Now let us deal with what the investors in these securities have in the offering. Let us assume that for the time-being the order of SEBI is here to stay (for the procedure for setting it aside will bring the appeal/petition in due course). In this scenario, the companies are legally barred from renewing or offering any ULIPs. Thus the new/renewed scrips are contrary to law (being the order passed in terms of the SEBI Act). The law of contracts entitles the agreements not enforceable by law as 'void'. Thus the ULIPs, which are nothing but agreements between the subscribers and the insurance companies, are void till the time the SEBI order stay. In this scenario, a subscriber cannot bring an action for violation of any of the terms of the ULIP by the company and vice versa. In fact the object of the such agreements, under the law of contracts, is also unlawful as it is forbidden by law and thus no legal rights flow from ULIP. 

This basically means that the subscribers will not be able to ventilate their grievances, for non-performance of its obligation by the insurance company under the ULIP before a court of law. A rule of equity might come to help the subscriber, but then it also another rule that law does not help those who knowingly enter into illegal agreements. Thus even the investors are here for a spin. To that extent one has to admit that the SEBI order is incomplete as it does not state the status of the ULIPs already subscribed to by the investors. It stops by saying that the order passed is "without prejudice to any action that might be taken by SEBI in respect of offer documents or advertisements issued by these entities for products (including ULIPs) having an investment component in the nature of mutual funds launched so far." Thus the status of the existing ULIPs depends upon further orders of SEBI and as to which side the camel will sit is anyone's guess. 

Post-script

The companies which are the subject-matter of the SEBI order are as follows;

a. Aegon Religare Life Insurance Company Limited
b. Aviva Life Insurance Company India Limited
c. Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company Limited
d. Bharti AXA Life Insurance Company Limited
e. Birla Sun Life Insurance Company Limited
f. HDFC Standard Life Insurance Company Limited
g. ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Company Limited
h. ING Vyasa Life Insurance Company Limited
i. Kotak Mahindra Old Mutual Life Insurance Limited
j. Max New York Life Insurance Co. Limited
k. Metlife India Insurance Company Limited
l. Reliance Life Insurance Company Limited
m. SBI Life Insurance Company Limited
n. TATA AIG Life Insurance Company Limited 

Latest Update

For further update on the Ordinance to resolve the tussle and our views on the same, have a look at the latest post.