10 leading Supreme Court decisions in March 2020

In the wake of the health crisis, all major institutions, including the Supreme Court, have shut down. We took this opportunity to get our act together and bring to you some premium content. Going in reverse order, we have cataloged 10 major decisions of the Supreme Court handed out in March 2020 in this post.

(1) Right to Information - Is is not pervasive 

In the case of Chief Information Commissioner v. High Court of Gujarat the Supreme Court (three-judge bench) has declared that every inconsistency between the RTI law and any other law as regards supply of information is not fatal. Therefore upholding the rules governing supply of information adopted by the High Court of Gujarat, the Supreme Court has opined that the High Court can imposed additional conditions for furnishing the information. In particular, the condition under the High Court Rules for filing affidavit and giving reasons as to why the information is required which, thought contrary to the RTI Act, has been upheld by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has also upheld the exclusion of the RTI Act, under the High Court rules, to the copies of judicial work of the High Court and the same can be sought only under the High Court rules and not under the RTI. [Civil Appeal No. 1966-1967/2020 dated 04.03.2020]

(2) Workers are also 'consumers' of Government Schemes

In this path breaking decision in the case of Joint Labour Commissioner and Registering Officer v. Kesar Lal the Supreme Court has expanded the scope of consumer laws to hold that even a worker who is denied benefit of Government schemes can successfully bring a case under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. In this case the Respondent Worker had applied for grants under the Building and Other Construction Workers’ (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 for purpose of his daughter's marriage. This was rejected by the Officer of the Rajasthan Government citing that the paperwork was not complete and formalities were not complied. The worker complained against this rejection under the consumer law and this came was finally upheld by the Supreme Court. [Civil Appeal No. 2014/2020 dated 17.03.2020]

(3) Proceedings for removal of 'probationer' not entitled to strict judicial review compared to confirmed employees

In the case of Rajasthan High Court v. Ved Priya the Supreme Court was concerned with correctness of view of the High Court (on its administrative side) which has removed the Respondent probationer from services as a judge of the lower court. This proceeding was challenged by way of writ petition before the High Court. The Supreme Court in this decision exhaustively surveyed the earlier decisions regarding the right of probationers to be confirmed and the corresponding right of the employer to remove the probationers. Upholding the removal, the Supreme Court specifically observed that unsatisfactory performance is sufficient for removal in such cases and there is no necessity for a full-fledged inquiry at the end of probation period. [Civil Appeal No. 8933-8934/2017 dated 18.03.2020]

(4) Pension available even for employees who have opted for VRS scheme

Deciding the disputed question (on which even the earlier benches of the Supreme Court has a conflicting view), a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India v. Radhey Shyam Pandey has declared that even those employees opted for the Bank's Voluntary Retirement Scheme after 15 years are entitled to pension. The Court specifically concluded that the action of the Bank in denying the benefit of the pension scheme was unfair in this case and it should have considered its social obligation to its past employees as well. [Civil Appeal No. 2463/2015 dated 02.03.2020]

(5) Limitation period for execution of foreign decree has to be adopted from the foreign country

There is no limitation period under the Indian law for execution of a foreign decree. In this background in the case of Bank of Baroda v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. the Supreme Court has concluded that the limitation period for execution of foreign decree in the host country will apply even in India. For example if a decree of UK can be executed in UK only within 6 years, the same decree when sought to be executed in India, can also be executed within 6 years and after that it will be barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that any other limitation period will imply that when the decree cannot be originally executed in its own country, it can still be executed in India, which will be an anamalous situation and cannot be accepted. [Civil Appeal No. 2175/2020 dated 17.03.2020]

(6) 5-judge bench clarifies the law on Land Acquisition

In 2013 a new land acquisition law replaced the earlier law of 1894. This 2013 law made specific provisions was lapse of a land acquisition i.e. situations where land cannot be acquired due to non-completion of conditions within the stipulated period. There were multiple proceedings before various High Courts in the country and also there were many contrary opinions in the Supreme Court itself on when do these conditions get satisfied. A five judge bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal has declared the final position. This is a detailed decision running into over 300 pages with clear set of conclusions towards the end. [SLP(C) No. 9036-9038/2016 dated 06.03.2020]

(7) Same expression can have different meaning under different laws

Can the same term mean differently when used in different laws. The Supreme Court has answered in the affirmative. In the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur v. Universal Ferro & Allied Chemicals Ltd. the Supreme Court considered the provisions of Central Excise Act, 1944 where the expression 'sale' is defined to cover a mere transfer of possession of goods in the course of business. Holding that it was possible for the law-makers to give a different definition which was contrary to the general meaning of the expression and once such a different definition was used, the meaning under this definition was to be applied. In other words, the general meaning of the expression 'sale' was not relevant. [Civil Appeal No. 848-852/2009 dated 06.03.2020] 

(8) Obligation of the vehicle owner for insurance claim purposes

In the case of Nirmala Kothari v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. the Supreme Court has held that it is the obligation of the insured to verify the driving licence of the person to whom the vehicle is being given. If the driving licence looks genuine, that obligation is complete. There is no obligation to take up the matter with the RTO to seek confirmation. In such cases, the Insurance Company has to give the insurance claim and it cannot deny the liability even if the licence later turns out to be forged. [Civil Appeal No. 1999-2000/2020 dated 04.03.2020]

(9) RBI Ban on crypto-currency set aside.

The Supreme Court in the case of Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank of India has quashed the ban imposed by the RBI on crypto-currencies. Taking note of the legal position outside India and the fast changes happening elsewhere, according to the Supreme Court the decision of the RBI was disproportionate and unreasonable making it vulnerable to constitutional stipulations. [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 528/2018 dated 04.03.2020]

(10) Anyone can work as an architect. 

Holding that there is no legal requirement to get registered with Council of Architecture, the Supreme Court in the case of Council of Architecture v. Mukesh Goyal has held that the law only prohibits an unregistered individual from using the title of 'architect'. [Civil Appeal No. 1819/2020 dated 17.03.2020]

Some recent landmark decisions

For the benefit of our readers and also to catch-up the recent developments, we are running in this post short notes on some of the landmark decisions in recent past. These decisions are landmark on various counts; either they reveal a jurisprudence shift or they deal with a legal controversy which was vividly followed up by national media and the citizens alike. Some are landmark on account of the sheer fact of these decisions being rendered by larger bench of the Supreme Court and thus an important and likely stable constitutional declaration flows from these decisions.

Constitution Bench decisions

1. This series of two decisions is actually a revisit of the constitutional stipulations relating to appointment of judges amongst the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The law was firmly settled by earlier larger bench decisions. However the incumbent Government initiated the process which led to amendment of the Constitution. This amendment was meant to bring in place a new positive legal order regarding the appointment process. In the first decision i.e. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 13 of 2015, decision dated 16.10.2015], a five-judges bench of the Supreme Court declared the amendment to the illegal being contrary to the basic constitutional principles. In essence, therefore, they revived the appointment process in place prior to this arrangement known as the 'Collegium'. However in this decision itself the judges agreed that there was room for improvement in the Collegium system and this led to the second decision. In this decision i.e. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 13 of 2015, decision dated 16.12.2015] the same five-judges of the Supreme Court broadly examined the suggestions received from various quarters towards improving the Collegium system, only to conclude that it was beyond the judicial realm to lay down the policy. On such account it directed the Government of India to frame 'Memorandum of Procedures' which would serve as the Working Document and lay down the protocol for the appointment of the judges. These decisions are landmark in various senses. Firstly they are by constitutional benches and thus carry significant weight. Secondly, there is a significant discussion on the 'basic structure principle' and also the importance of 'judicial review' and 'independence of judiciary', which are key constitutional tenets. Thirdly and more importantly, it is rare for the Supreme Court to declare as illegal a constitutional amendment and thus these decisions carry significant insight on the subject. 

 

 

2. The decision of another five-judges bench of the Supreme Court in Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker [Civil Appeal No. 6203-6204/2016 decision dated 13.07.2016] is another significant decision for it delineates the scope and ambit of the powers vested in a Governor of a State under the Constitution. In this decision the Court was examining the allegations that the Governor did not adopt a bipartisan role which was expected of him and instead went beyond the scope of authority conferred upon him. In fact in this decision the Supreme Court reinstated the exective Government which had not found favour amongst the stipulations of the Government, which makes it perhaps an unprecedented decision on large counts. The case also involved the relationship between the Government and Speaker of a Legislative Assembly and how far could the Governor direct the Speaker to carry out specified functions. 

 

 3. Another decision, also of five-judges of the Supreme Court is in the case of Union of India v. V. Sriharan Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 185/2014 decision dated 02.12.2015] which dilutes a number of decisions on the subject as also the common understanding to declare that a life sentence means imprisonment till the end of life. There was a common understanding that life sentence means 14 years. However the Court has declared otherwise and held that the power of the Government to remit sentence after 14 years is not a matter of right but only a possibility for early release. This decision also declares that the Court has power to give a fixed sentence (say 20 years) to a person without any possibility of early release.

Some other decisions, but not of constitution benches of Supreme Court

4.  This decision in Kedar Nath Yadav v. State of West Bengal [Civil Appeal No. 8438/2016] runs into over 200 pages and relates to validity of land acquisition in West Bengal relating to Tata Nano plant. Dealing with a very emotive issue for the local residents and also a politically sensitive matter for the incumbent government, the Supreme Court has dealt extensively with land acquisition laws and the interse considerations required to be considered for upholding acquisition of land. In conclusion the Supreme Court has directed that "land shall be given back to the land owners and compensation if any paid to them shall not be recovered from them those who have not collected it are free to collect the same in lieu of damages for deprivation of possession for ten years".


5.  Additionally, another Supreme Court decision is the case of Shreya Singhal v. Union fo India [Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 167 of 2012, decision dated 24.03.2015] where certain provisions of the Information Technology Act, 2000 has been declared as unconstitutional and illegal for they are impediment to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the Constitution to its citizens. This decision renders interesting insights, also on a comparative legal analysis perspective, the various dimensions of free-speech jurisprudence and its ambit under the Constitution of India. A must read for students.


6. In a very recent decision in Chandrakeshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar [Criminal Appeal No. 932 of 2016, decision dated 30.09.2016] the Supreme Court has cancelled the bail granted by the High Court to Md. Shahabuddin. This decision presents interesting insights over the competing considerations between personal liberty of an individual and the larger societal interests. Referring to its earlier decisions on the subject, the Supreme Court held that it was important to balance the "fundamental right to individual liberty with the interest of the society".


7. While this is not a decision, this nonetheless has severe ramifications for the future of Supreme Court. In V. Vasanthakumar v. H.C. Bhatia [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 36 of 2016 order dated 13.07.2016] three judges of the Supreme Court have referred to a larger bench adjudication of certain constitutional questions, which are as under;

1. With access to justice being a fundamental right, would the said right stand denied to litigants, due to the unduly long delay in the disposal of cases in the Supreme Court?
2. Would the mere increase in the number of judges be an answer to the problem of undue delay in disposal of cases and to what extent would such increase be feasible?
3. Would the division of the Supreme Court into a Constitutional wing and an appellate wing be an answer to the problem?
4. Would the fact that the Supreme Court of India is situate in the far North, in Delhi, rendering travel from the Southern states and some other states in India, unduly long and expensive, be a deterrent to real access to justice?
5. Would the Supreme Court sitting in benches in different parts of India be an answer to the last mentioned problem?
6. Has the Supreme Court of India been exercising jurisdiction as an ordinary court of appeal on facts and law, in regard to routine cases of every description?
7. Is the huge pendency of cases in the Supreme Court, caused by the Court not restricting its consideration, as in the case of the Apex Courts of other countries, to Constitutional issues, questions of national importance, differences of opinion between different High Courts, death sentence cases and matters entrusted to the Supreme Court by express provisions of the Constitution?
8. Is there a need for having Courts of Appeal, with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and finally decide the vast proportion of the routine cases, as well as Article 32 petitions now being decided by the Supreme Court of India, especially when a considerable proportion of the four million cases pending before the High Court may require review by a higher intermediate court, as these judgments of the High Courts may fail to satisfy the standards of justice and competence expected from a superior court?
9. If four regional Courts of Appeal are established, in the Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western regions of the Country, each manned by, say, fifteen judges, elevated or appointed to each Court by the Collegium, would this not satisfy the requirement of ‘access to justice’ to all litigants from every part of the country?
10. As any such proposal would need an amendment to the Constitution, would the theory of ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution be violated, if in fact, such division of exclusive jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal, enhances the efficacy of the justice delivery system without affecting the independence of the judicial wing of the State?
11. In view of cases pending in the Supreme Court of India on average for about 5 years, in the High Courts again for about 8 years, and anywhere between 5- 10 years in the Trial Courts on the average, would it not be part of the responsibility and duty of the Supreme Court of India to examine through a Constitution Bench, the issue of divesting the Supreme Court of about 80% of the pendency of cases of a routine nature, to recommend to Government, its opinion on the proposal for establishing four Courts of Appeal, so that the Supreme Court with about 2500 cases a year instead of about 60000, may regain its true status as a Constitutional Court?

8. And then in this series, we refer to the decision of the Delhi High Court in Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi v. Union of India [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5888/2015 decision dated 04.08.2016] where the High Court has opined upon the interse powers of the Government of India and the Government of NCT of Delhi. Running into about 200 pages, this decision relied upon a nine-judge Supreme Court decision in New Delhi Municipal Corporation v. State of Punjab (1997) 7 SCC 339 to hold that Delhi continues to be Union Territory, albeit with special status, but does not enjoy statehood. This decision opines upon a long pending political struggle in Delhi and may not be the last word on the subject as the Supreme Court is currently seized of the dispute. Nonetheless various interesting aspects relating to the special position of Delhi and its legal attributes.

Moral Science as a mandatory subject: Supreme Court declines to direct

Recently a case came up before the Supreme Court. It was filed by a lady-lawyer requesting the Court to direct one and all to ensure that 'moral science' was made a mandatory subject in class-room education upto class XII. In the petition it was stated that "she is deeply distressed with the rapidly degrading moral values in the society touching every aspect of life where making money, anyhow has become the sole motto of society” and in her view "the present education system does not inculcate the true purpose of education, which is to produce a good human being". The lady-lawyer further submitted before the Supreme Court that the State is under "a constitutional obligation to endeavour to provide educational facilities which inculcate moral values in the course of primary and secondary education". She also stressed upon Article 25 and 51A(f) of the Constitution of India to submit before the Supreme Court that it should pass an order "for the inclusion of moral science as a compulsory subject in the syllabus of school education from classes I to XII in order to inculcate moral values and nurture national character in the national interest". The Supreme Court, however, refused.

In its order reported as Mrs. Santosh Singh v. Union of India [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1028/2014] the Supreme Court took note of these and other submissions and also the response of CBSE and NCERT to opine that sufficient steps were being taken by the concerned authorities and in any case the subject brought before it was beyond judicial review. 

Some of the pertinent observations made by the Supreme Court while rejecting the petition as are under;

14 There can be no gain-saying the fact that moral values are an integral component of value based education. The purpose of education is to engender in the young, a spirit of enquiry, a desire for knowledge and a sense of values. Among those values are the fundamental values on which our constitutional core is founded: liberty, equality and the dignity of each individual. The purpose of education also includes the creation of responsible and informed citizens conscious both of their rights and of their duties to others.

15 Education is an important instrument towards the development of the individual as indeed, it is a vital instrument in nation building. Technology has effaced conventional barriers and the world has become a globally networked community of information ideas. The challenges which confront the system of education have evolved rapidly, perhaps too rapidly for our educational system to develop pragmatic solutions to meet them.

16 The issue before the Court is whether a mandamus of this nature can be issued by the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction in the public interest.

17 While there can be no dispute about the need of providing value based education, what form this should take and the manner in which values should be inculcated ought not to be ordained by the court. The court singularly lacks the expertise to do so. The petitioner has a grouse about what she describes as the pervading culture of materialism in our society. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 is not a panacea for all ills but a remedy for the violation of fundamental rights. The remedies for such perceived grievances as the petitioner has about the dominant presence of materialism must lie elsewhere and it is for those who have the competence and the constitutional duty to lay down and implement educational policies to deal with such problems.

18 There is a tendency on the part of public interest petitioners to assume that every good thing which society should aspire to achieve can be achieved through the instrumentality of the court. The judicial process provides remedies for constitutional or legal infractions. Public interest litigation allows a relaxation of the strict rules of locus standi. However, the court must necessarily abide the parameters which govern a nuanced exercise of judicial power. Hence, where an effort is made to bring issues of governance before the court, the basic touch stone on which the invocation of jurisdiction must rest is whether the issue can be addressed within the framework of law or the Constitution. Matters of policy are entrusted to the executive arm of the State. The court is concerned with the preservation of the rule of law.

19 This petition is illustrative of matters which lie beyond the province of judicial review. Whether children pursuing their education from classes I to XII should be saddled with a separate course of moral science is not for the court to decide. Whether a value based educational system would best be subserved by including a separate subject on moral science or whether value based teaching should traverse the entire gamut of a prescribed curriculum is a matter which cannot be resolved by applying settled norms of judicial review. These are matters which cannot be determined in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court under Article 32. 

20 The argument on morality seems attractive to those - like the well meaning petitioner -who lament the decadence of civilisation. Combine morality with the need to redefine the values which a society wishes for its young and you have a seemingly persuasive argument in support. The difficulty in a court mandated acceptance of this argument is precisely its inability to unravel the complexities in the position and the answers which it proposes.

21 Morality is one and, however important it may sound to some, it still is only one element in the composition of values that a just society must pursue. There are other equally significant values which a democratic society may wish for education to impart to its young. Among those is the acceptance of a plurality and diversity of ideas, images and faiths which unfortunately faces global threats. Then again, equally important is the need to foster tolerance of those who hold radically differing views, empathy for those whom the economic and social milieu has cast away to the margins, a sense of compassion and a realisation of the innate humanity which dwells in each human being. Value based education must enable our young to be aware of the horrible consequences of prejudice, hate and discrimination that continue to threaten people and societies the world over. Morality as a defining concept of spreading values may run the risk of being dangerously one sided, exposing young citizens to the same dogma which those who decry the creed of materialism seek to change. Moreover, morality itself is a notion which has varying hues.

22 It is unrealistic for the court to assume that it can provide solutions to vexed issues which involve drawing balances between conflicting dimensions that travel beyond the legal plane. Courts are concerned with issues of constitutionality and legality. It is difficult to perceive how matters to which solutions may traverse the fields of ideology, social theory, policy making and experimentation can be regulated by this court such as by issuing a mandamus to enforce a scheme of instruction in a particular subject in school education. Should a subject be taught at all? Should a set of values or a line of enquiry and knowledge be incorporated as a separate subject of discourse in an educational system? Would a horizontal integration of a given set of values across existing subjects better achieve a desirable result? Is it at all desirable to impose another subject of study upon the already burdened school curriculum? 

23 These are vexed issues to which more than one solution may appear just. That is exactly the reason why a resolution of such matters must rest with those who have the responsibility to teach and govern over matters of education. Every good that is perceived to be in the interest of society cannot be mandated by the court. Nor is the judicial process an answer to every social ill which a public interest petitioner perceives. A matter such as the present to which a solution does not rest in a legal or constitutional framework is incapable of being dealt with in terms of judicially manageable standards.

Sedetion or Freedom of Speech: Delhi High Court ponders

"Spring season is a time when nature becomes green and flower blooms in all colours. This spring why the colour of peace is eluding the prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) situated in the heart of Delhi needs to be answered by its students, faculty members and those managing the affairs of this national university." This is how the Delhi High Court in its order has addressed the recent controversy surrounding the arrest of student leader of JNU while examining his request for bail.

In its order in Kanhaiya Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 558/2016 [decision dated 02.03.2016] the Delhi High Court noted that the student leader asserted "his fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India on the ground that the utterances (speech or slogans) attributable to him cannot be termed to be in violation of any law and as such he has not committed any offence". The High Court thereafter reproduced the allegedly seditious comments / statements made at the event and also reproduced colour photographs of the event which led to his arrest.

The Delhi High Court judge concedes that in the factual background of the case she finds herself "standing on a crossroad" [para 38]. It is further held that while as a student leader one is "expected to be responsible and accountable for any anti-national event organised in the campus", the facts reveal that it "is a case of raising anti-national slogans which do have the effect of threatening national integrity" [para 40]. Nonetheless it student leader is reminded that "persons enjoy the freedom to raise such slogans in the comfort of University Campus but without realising that they are in this safe environment because our forces are there at the battle field situated at the highest altitude of the world where even the oxygen is so scarce that those who are shouting anti-national slogans holding posters of Afzal Guru and Maqbool Bhatt close to their chest honoring their martyrdom, may not be even able to withstand those conditions for an hour even" and the "kind of slogans raised may have demoralizing effect on the family of those martyrs who returned home in coffin draped in tricolor".

The High Court expressed its opinion on the above, in the following terms;

"39. As President of Jawaharlal Nehru University Students Union, the petitioner was expected to be responsible and accountable for any anti-national event organised in the campus. Freedom of speech guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Constitution of India has enough room for every citizen to follow his own ideology or political affiliation within the framework of our Constitution. While dealing with the bail application of the petitioner, it has to be kept in mind by all concerned that they are enjoying this freedom only because our borders are guarded by our armed and paramilitary forces. Our forces are protecting our frontiers in the most difficult terrain in the world i.e. Siachen Glacier or Rann of Kutch.

... 

41. Suffice it to note that such persons enjoy the freedom to raise such slogans in the comfort of University Campus but without realising that they are in this safe environment because our forces are there at the battle field situated at the highest altitude of the world where even the oxygen is so scarce that those who are shouting anti-national slogans holding posters of Afzal Guru and Maqbool Bhatt close to their chest honoring their martyrdom, may not be even able to withstand those conditions for an hour even.

42. The kind of slogans raised may have demoralizing effect on the family of those martyrs who returned home in coffin draped in tricolor.

43. The petitioner claims his right regarding freedom of speech and expression guaranteed in Part-III under Article 19(1)(a) of Constitution of India. He has also to be reminded that under Part-IV under Article 51A of Constitution of India fundamental duties of every citizen have been specified alongwith the fact that rights and duties are two sides of the same coin.

44. The petitioner belongs to an intellectual class pursuing Ph.d. from International School of Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, which is considered as hub of intellectuals. He may have any political affiliation or ideology. He has every right to pursue that but it can be only within the framework of our Constitution. India is a living example of unity in diversity. Freedom of expression enjoyed by every citizen can be subjected to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) of our Constitution. The feelings or the protest reflected in the slogans needs introspection by the student community whose photographs are available on record holding posters carrying photographs of Afzal Guru and Maqbool Bhatt."

The High Court has sternly advised the JNU administration to ensure that the infection is not spread further. On such lines the High Court has observed as under;

"45. The faculty of JNU also has to play its role in guiding them to the right path so that they can contribute to the growth of the nation and to achieve the object and vision for which Jawaharlal Nehru University was established.

46. The reason behind anti-national views in the mind of students who raised slogans on the death anniversary of Afzal Guru, who was convicted for attack on our Parliament, which led to this situation have not only to be found by them but remedial steps are also required to be taken in this regard by those managing the affairs of the JNU so that there is no recurrence of such incident.

47. The investigation in this case is at nascent stage. The thoughts reflected in the slogans raised by some of the students of JNU who organized and participated in that programme cannot be claimed to be protected as fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. I consider this as a kind of infection from which such students are suffering which needs to be controlled/cured before it becomes an epidemic.

48. Whenever some infection is spread in a limb, effort is made to cure the same by giving antibiotics orally and if that does not work, by following second line of treatment. Sometimes it may require surgical intervention also. However, if the infection results in infecting the limb to the extent that it becomes gangrene, amputation is the only treatment."

In all, the High Court has brought out its views on the state-of-affairs and it is not just the students, JNU administration but the nation at large which has to revisit its standing on the right to criticize (as a part of freedom of speech) versus its outlook on national integrity. More importantly our political leaders must introspect, before they decide to endorse one view over other, that may be affirming growth of a Frankenstein as the High Court indirectly observes.

National Herald Case - Delhi High Court decision

A recent decision of the Delhi High Court has created quiet a storm in country, particularly among the political circles. This decision dismissed the petition [filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure] filed by senior Congress party officials. The petition was filed against an order passed by the Criminal Court directing proceedings to be initiated in a criminal case alleging cheating on the part of these officials. 

The High Court has essentially held that, on a prima facie basis, the order of the Criminal Court is essentially based on documentations relevant for such direction and therefore there is no reason for the High Court to exercise its discretion and extraordinary power to quash the proceeding initiated by the Criminal Court. For the benefit of our readers we have uploaded the decision of the High Court. 

While the decision of the High Court is largely on discussion of facts and the legal position relating to discretion being exercised in such cases by the High Court, we have sought to cull out some of the excepts relevant to the national polity and in general relating to corruption, which are as under;

"1. Probity of a legendary National Political Party is under scanner in these petitions. This case is one of its own kind. The complainant claims to be a public spirited person, who wishes to expose cheating, criminal breach of trust and criminal misappropriation in high places with a view to protect general public interest. In an attempt to do so, recourse to criminal law is sought to be made. The complainant, who is a respondent herein, is a Parliamentarian, who claims to have been a Member of Parliament for five times and his credentials are highlighted in the impugned order. The respondent-complainant claims to be champion in leading crusade against corruption. This time, he has sought to expose cheating, fraud, criminal misappropriation, etc., by Office Bearers of the Congress Party who also happen to be the members of a Private Company-Young Indian Private Company (hereinafter referred to as Y.I.) and major shareholders of Associated Journals Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as AJL), which was engaged in publishing of newspapers including National Herald, etc..

…

28. The respective stand taken by both the sides needs to be considered in view of the fact that in a democratic set up, how a Political Party of national stature acts is everybody’s concern. Rather, it is a matter of serious concern as allegations of fraud, etc. are levelled against the Congress Party, who has ruled the Nation for many decades. Precisely, it is the act of Office Bearers of Congress Party and their associates which is under scanner in this case.

…

31. In the instant case, it cannot be disputed that the Office Bearers of the Congress Party are the trustees of the funds belonging to the Party. No doubt, a Political Party can have income from other sources as well and can invest money in mutual funds, etc., to augment its resources. However, it has to be kept in mind that the allegations against the Office Bearers of the Congress Party are of siphoning off the party funds in a clandestine manner. The impropriety of extending interest free loans to a separate legal entity i.e. AJL, which is a Public Limited Company, by the Congress Party is a matter of concern in a democratic set up, particularly, when the source of Congress Party’s fund is largely from donations given by public and so, any citizen can legitimately question the siphoning off funds by Political Party. What crops up in the mind of a prudent person is as to where was the need of extending interest free loans to a Public Limited Company engaged in a commercial venture of publishing newspapers.

32. Considering the fact that AJL has sizeable assets of `2000 crores, it needs to be explained by petitioners as to what was the need to assign the huge debt of `90 crores when this debt could have been easily liquidated by AJL from its sizeable assets. Even writing off such a huge debt by the Congress Party can legitimately attract allegations of cheating, fraud, etc.. Petitioners had gone step further in conspiring to get this huge debt assigned to a Special Purpose Vehicle i.e. Y.I. and thereafter, to hijack AJL via Y.I.. Such grave allegations levelled against petitioners cannot be brushed aside lightly by relying upon judicial precedents cited, to conclude that the ingredients of the criminal offences alleged are lacking. To say the least, to do so would be preposterous. Such a prima facie view is being taken in view of the fact that the assignment of the huge debt by Congress Party to Y.I. was for a paltry sum of `50 lacs. This is certainly questionable and justifiably attracts the allegations of cheating, misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, etc.. Such a view is being taken as it needs to be explained before the trial court as to how the net worth of AJL can be negative when it has assets worth crores of rupees. It also crops up in the mind of a prudent person as to why interest free loan was assigned and why it was not written off. In any case, writing off such a huge debt by a legendry Political Party is indeed questionable. Instead of adopting such a questionable course, what was done by the Congress Party is more questionable. It also needs to be answered as to why the genuine shareholders were marginalized in the Extraordinary General Meeting, which was attended by just seven shareholders. Such a questionable conduct of petitioners certainly invites allegations of committing the offences for which petitioners have been summoned. Is it not criminal misappropriation of Congress Party’s funds? This aspect needs to be addressed after respondent-complainant is cross-examined at the pre-charge stage. It also needs to be examined at pre-charge stage as to whether lacs of citizens who had donated to the Congress Party felt cheated by assignment of such a huge debt to Y.I. who was managed by none others than petitioners, who were Office Bearers of Congress Party as well as Directors of Y.I.. Not only this, the main persons, who were instrumental in allegedly siphoning off political funds were the recipients of the assignment of the huge debt by the Congress Party and they were the same persons, who had clandestinely acquired the control of AJL. All this smacks of criminality. What species of criminal offence is made out is not required to be seen at this initial stage.

…

38. This Court is of the considered view that the gravity of the allegations levelled against petitioners has a fraudulent flavour involving a national Political Party and so, serious imputations smacking of criminality levelled against petitioners need to be properly looked into."

Have a look at the decision.

No PIL for challenging Lok Pal Bill Committee: High Court

Dismissing the public interest litigation challenging the constitution of the Lok Pal Committee Bill the Delhi High Court in a recent decision declared that there was no public interest shown to the involved in the challenge and thus the petition was dismissed at the admission stage itself. The decision, authored by the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court himself, dismissed the petition filed by Hemant Baburao Patil, the President of National Anti Corruption Public Power in the following terms;

6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it is manifest that members of the Committee do not hold public office and, hence, there cannot be any eligibility criteria. Therefore, the concept of quo warranto is not applicable. A drafting committee has been constituted which pertains to a pre-enactment stage. We have our grave doubt whether the same can be scrutinized while exercising the power of judicial review. The Constitution casts an obligation on the part of the Court while exercising power of judicial review to test the legislation in the constitutional backdrop, but not at a stage when the drafting of a Bill is in process. It is a resolution passed by the Ministry of Law and Justice for drafting of a Bill. It can be treated as an internal matter of the Executive and exclusively in the domain of Executive. The suitability of the persons, we are disposed to think, cannot be a matter of judicial review, more so in a matter of the present nature. 

7. Resultantly, we do not perceive any public interest involved in this writ petition and, accordingly, there is no need to call for any kind of counter affidavit/return from the respondents. The writ petition does not deserve to be entertained for the purpose of adjudication and, accordingly, the same stands dismissed.

Have a look at the decision.

New laws on the anvil: The Budget proposals

The annual ritual of the Government of India presenting its plans and outlook for the upcoming Fiscal Year took place on the 28th of last month, with the Finance Minster delivering his Speech and presenting in the Parliament the Budget for the Year 2011-12. While we are deviating four our stand on earlier Budgets, wherein we put-forth in a pre-budget predictive exercise, our proposals and aspirations from the Budget, we have undertaken an extensive review of the Finance Minister's speech and other documents to bring forth to our readers the changes proposed in the legal scenario of the country.

The Finance Minster, presenting his outlook for the upcoming year, has presented and offered a number of new legislations and also proposed amendments in the earlier ones. In a brief note, we have captured these in the following bullets;

1. Public Debt Management Agency of India Bill - scheduled for the next Financial Year - as an independent Debt Management Office in the Finance Ministry;
2. A Constitutional Amendment for introduction of comprehensive Goods and Service Tax and the draft legislation thereon;
3. Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority Bill - a new revised Bill - as a part of Financial Sector Reforms;
4. Factoring and Assignment of Receivables Bill - as a part of Financial Sector Reforms;
5. The Companies Bill - received from the Parliamentary Standing Committee;
6. National Food Security Bill - guaranteeing food security for all citizens.

Further, amendments have been proposed in a number of existing laws, namely;

1. Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2003 - laying down the fiscal road map for the next five years;
2. Insurance Laws (Amendment) Bill;
3. Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Bill;
4. Banking Laws Amendment Bill;
5. State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks Laws) Amendment Bill;
6. Recovery of Debt for Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993;
7. Securitization, Asset Reconstruction and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002;
8. Indian Stamps Act, 1899.

The Budget speech has also proposed the for the constitution of the following committees, which we envisage into resulting into further legislations;

1. Task Force on system of direct transfer of subsidy for kerosene, LPG and fertilisers;
2. Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission;
3. Group of Ministers for reconciliation of environmental concerns.

We can only hope that the promises and assurances of the Minister are carried out in spirit, such that the legal structure receives the requires reforms at the earliest.