High Court finds police guilty for atrocities on lawyers

In an elaborately written decision spanning nearly over 200 pages, the Madras High Court has found the police authorities to be guilty for having committed atrocities on lawyers in the premises of the High Court in the widely reported clashes in February this year. A major part of the decision narrates the facts in extensio, no single bit of detail has been spared. However the remarks of the High Court are no less scathing. The High Court has not restrained itself to pin-point the responsibility on the higher ranks of police authorities in much as the decision states as under;

It was a pity that while according to the Commissioner of Police the threat was to the lives of huge number of people and the High Court was bustling with activities since the advocates started attending Courts after withdrawing the boycott on 19.02.2009, instead of allowing such activities to remain without any disturbance, the act of the police themselves in having chosen to allow the process of surrender of accused to take place in a more vulnerable situation that too by gathering nearly 421 policemen, the Commissioner of Police has miserably failed in his responsibilities and duty to protect the interest of public and instead made himself responsible for the most imprudent act of creating a situation of lawlessness which ultimately resulted in very ghastly incident to take place inside the High Court premises and thereby creating a blot on the institution namely the Judiciary. We therefore hold that the root cause for the unsavoury incident that took place on 19.02.2009, was the promptitude of the accused Advocates led by Mr.R.Karuppan who offered to surrender themselves. We further hold that by the  imprudent act of the police in having encouraged the offer of surrender to take place insider the High Court campus, the high level police officers, namely, the Commissioner of Police, the Additional Commissioner of Police, the jurisdictional Joint Commissioner of Police and the jurisdiction Deputy Commissioner of Police, sowed the seed for the ghastly incident. As far as Question No.(i) is concerned, though as claimed by Ms.R.Vaigai that the Judiciary is also entitled for the extent of immunity i.e. Available to the Parliament cannot be accepted, in the same breath, it will have to be stated that Judiciary as a constitutional machinery is entitled for higher amount of protection and safety and therefore the other wings of the State have to display utmost restraint while carrying out their operations inside the premises of the institution. Consequently when such other institution like police or executive want to deal with the said institution, they are bound to get necessary instructions and if necessary permission for carrying out any of their activities which would otherwise cause prejudice to the institution. 

The incident, as unraveled chronologically in the decision, has been described as under;

... The members of the Bar went on an indefinite boycott of Courts on and from 29.01.2009, alleging that the Government was not taking any action to stop the genocide of Tamils in Sri Lanka. As part of their agitation, some lawyers entered the First Court presided over by the Hon ble Acting Chief Justice where some of the lawyers who were attending to their cases were asked to join the boycott. ... Several other incidents as part of agitation of the lawyers was also reported on various dates. ... On 17.02.2009, Dr.Subramaniam Swamy as party-in-person stated to have appeared before the Bench presided over by Hon ble Mr.Justice P.K.Misra and Hon ble Mr.Justice K.Chandru, for getting himself impleaded in a case related to a temple situated at Chidambaram. Around 11.45 a.m. some of the agitating lawyers stated to have entered the Court Hall of Hon ble Mr.Justice P.K.Misra Bench and apart from abusing and assaulting Dr.Subramaniam Swamy, stated to have thrown eggs at him, under the direct gaze of the Hon ble Judges. In fact the Judges frowned upon the misbehaviour of all those lawyers and recorded the same in their order dated 17.02.2009. A copy of which was forwarded to the Hon ble Acting Chief Justice for appropriate action and the Registry was also directed to send a copy of the said order to the Hon ble Chief Justice of India.

The then Commissioner of Police addressed a communication dated 17.02.2009, to the Registrar General pointing out the unsavory incident that took place in Court Hall No.3 and sought for the concurrence to register a criminal case and set the criminal law in motion against those advocates. The Registrar General by a communication dated 18.02.2009, informed the Commissioner of Police that it is for the police to register any criminal case on its own and the concurrence of the Registry is not required in law. ...

On 19.02.2009, according to the Commissioner of Police, there was a specific intelligence input from the Intelligence Section of the City Police and the State Special Branch CID that the advocates who were involved in the incident on 17.02.2009, in the 3rd Court Hall would create serious problems when Dr. Subramaniam Swamy was scheduled to visit the High Court in connection with a matter before the Hon ble Acting Chief Justice and in the 21st Court. (therefore) On 19.02.2009, the Commissioner of Police arranged for a heavy police guard in the High Court campus in order to ensure that no untoward incident takes place at the time of the visit of Dr.Subramaniam Swamy. ...

... A reference to the order of the Full Bench dated 19.02.2009, discloses that when the Court was in session, at about 3.30 to 3.45 pm., on hearing unusual noise, when enquiries were made, the Court was informed that large number of special police (Riot Police) personnel with lathis or guns have entered the Court premises and were pelting stones on the lawyers apart from making lathi charge. The vehicles parked inside the Court campus were stated to have been smashed in the process. The Hon ble Acting Chief Justice was stated to have immediately contacted the Commissioner of Police and the Chief Secretary over phone and directed them to remove the police force immediately from the High Court campus in as much as it entered without the permission of the Court or the Acting Chief Justice. Many of the learned Judges who also raised from the Court stated to have witnessed the gory incident. The Court was also informed about the assault on the Hon ble Mr. Justice A.C.Arumugaperumal Adityan. The order also states that the police were found chasing the persons inside the Court Halls and lathi charged the lawyers, staff and others. The situation was stated to have been beyond control and that the police force did not go out of the campus while the Commissioner of Police telephonically informed that he is in the Police Station and trying to get the police out of the campus. Subsequently, though the Commissioner of Police informed the Court that the police personnel have been removed from the campus, they were chasing the advocates who were coming outside the Court campus by beating them mercilessly. At about 5.30 5.45 pm it is stated that the Court learnt the police force had gone outside the campus. At that point of time, B-4 Police Station was stated to have been set on fire and on a query, the Commissioner of Police alleged that the advocates set fire to the Police Station while many of the lady lawyers present in the Court Hall and others informed that the police themselves set fire to the Police Station and were throwing the blame on the lawyers.

On these facts, the High Court suo motu began action to inquire in the cause of the incidents and to determine the persons responsible for the havoc. In the meanwhile the Supreme Court appointed a One Man Committee headed by Hon ble Mr.Justice B.N.Srikrishna, former Judge of the Supreme Court to enquire into the incident which happened on 19.02.2009. The Committee was to initially consider whether any immediate action is called for against the police
officers who allegedly allowed armed policemen to enter the premises of the High Court without permission of the Acting Chief Justice and file an interim report.

In this backdrop, noting with emphatically the aftermath of the incidents, the High Court observed,

It can be stated with authority that in the history of judicial functioning, such a disruption of Court proceedings to the magnitude to which it had taken place consequent to the ghastly incident that happened on 19.02.2009, had not occured. The factum of non-functioning of the whole of judicial institutions throughout the State for at least three days only mean that the judiciary was paralyzed and was made immobile for no fault of it. Due to the non-functioning of the judicial forum and thereby depriving of any common man to have access to the judicial institutions for redressal of his grievance, to be stated in the most humble manner was that the judiciary impliedly expressed its helplessness to extend its helping hand to any one who was really in need of judicial intervention seeking justice. Therefore, when the consequence that resulted by virtue of the occurrence that took place on 19.02.2009 is examined, there can be no two opinion that whomsoever was responsible for creating such a situation cannot be dealt with lightly or any leniency can be shown to such person/persons as otherwise it would only give a wrong signal that one can carryout any unsavoury operation of very high magnitude unmindful of the consequences and can get away with it by shifting the responsibility on others or by referring to very many circumstances as the cause for such ghastly incident.

The highest judicial forum of this State in whose premises such a ghastly incident was allowed to take place cannot be lightly ignored or dealt with, as it will not be in the interest of public at large to allow any one who dealt with the INSTITUTION in such a light hearted manner. In our considered opinion, unless very drastic and deterrent action is taken on the persons responsible for the occurrence that took place on 19.02.2009, the public faith on the institution would be totally eroded and if the institution fails to deal with such persons firmly or fails to deal with them in the appropriate manner, it would completely shake the confidence of the common man who seek reccour for all their other grievances in the normal day to day life.

The Bench, however, did not spare the lawyers who were held responsible for being the ones initiating the incident. The decision records;

Though one may feel what remains after the above order as against the police, we feel that as the highest Court of this State, some of the naked truth about the conduct of the lawyers also calls for reformation. We are fully conscious of the status of a lawyer in the society and by calling for a reformation, we do not mean any disrespect to the profession. With all the responsibilities instilled in this Court while at the same time being part of the legal fraternity, we will be failing in our duty if some of the factors which have developed in the recent past are not brought to light and the lawyer s community is directed to focus their attention more towards their greater assistance in the implementation of law and service to the society instead of providing any scope for unscrupulous elements to take advantage of enormous wealth and strength of power inbuilt in the legal profession for achieving their unlawful objectives. ...

While appreciating the fair statement made by the President of the Madras High Court Advocates Association, we are bound to point out that the abstaining of Courts by the lawyers for whatever reason it may be does not behave well. There are umpty number of various other methodologies by which without causing hurt to any one or without causing damage to any one and without disrupting the functioning of the Courts, the lawyers who belong to a noble profession can display their protest which would draw the attention of the concerned authorities with much more care and concern. It is not for this Court to suggest as to what those other peaceful methodology that can be resorted to.

At this juncture it will not be out of place to remind ourselves of the fact that the Father of our Nation the great Mahatma Gandhi, who fought for the Independence of this Country was himself a member of the legal fraternity. Every one of the other leaders namely Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Dr.Ambedkar, Dr.Rajaji, Dr.Jaykar, Alladi Krishnasamy Iyer and very many other great personalities who constituted the Constitution Assembly were all lawyers. In other words, the Magna Carta of this Country, namely the Constitution was framed by those great personalities who all belonged to the Lawyers community by exerting and toiling their mind, body and soul for nearly three long years i.e between 1947 and 1950 and that ultimately the Constitution was dedicated to the Nation on 26.01.1950.

It was for these reasons that the legal profession was always placed in  a high esteem by every other member of this Society and such confidence is still reposed in this profession as it has now become a settled position that it is the lawyers who can lead this Country in every other pursuit, also by virtue of the wealth of knowledge and know-how, learnt and retained by them. When that be the credibility of the profession, the time has now come for everyone who is part of this institution namely the legal fraternity to stand up and question to thyself whether we are proceeding in the right direction. ...

In fact on days of boycott, when out of necessity some of the parties appear before us, however much, the Court exhibit its anxiety to go for the rescue and render justice, it should be stated that due to inexperience and over anxiety of the parties they are either not in a position to place the facts in full before the Court and thereby disable the Court to render full justice and in many cases, the parties because of their inability to express their grievance remain as silent sufferers.

In this context, the submission of the learned Advocate General that the image of the lawyers in the opinion of the common man is highly eroded though may appear to be bit harsh is the real fact which has to be accepted with a pinch of salt. There is no gain saying that as lawyers belong to a very high clan and as such entitled for certain privileges in the Society, while at the same time when they fail to fulfill the obligations arising out of such status which the lawyers community is obliged to reciprocatively display to the Society at large, the same would certainly gain an impression adverse to their interest. In this context, the further fact remains as to, of the whole lot of the lawyers how many of them are really interested in abstaining from Courts. Therefore, it is high time that the Associations take a very pragmatic approach and take a firm decision to resort to any other passive method by which they can exhibit their protest in a subtle way instead of resorting to Boycott of Courts.

Have a look at the elaborate decision.

LIC linked insurance cos covered under RTI

In a recent decision, the full bench of Central Information Commission (CIC) has declared that (i) LIC Housing Finance Limited, (ii) LIC Mutual Fund Asset Management Co. Limited and (iii) GIC Housing Finance Limited are covered under the Right to Information Act and thus required to provide information to the public under the enactment. All the three companies had contested on various legal fours to argue that they were not public authorities but independent private entities not substantially financed and controlled by the Government and thus beyond the purview of the RTI Act. However dealing with each of the companies in particular and for independent reasons for each of them the CIC concluded that they all were public authorities and thus obliged to take all necessary steps to carry out their duties and responsibilities assigned by the Act.

In respect of LIC Housing Finance Limited, the CIC examined the shareholding pattern of the companies to conclude that 

"it can be inferred that the control of LIC over LICHFL is explicit and effective. The very fact that Chairman of the LIC is also the Chairman of LICHFL further strengthened this inference. The appellant has also submitted that if the shareholding of other Banks is added to the total shareholding of the PSU, the total shareholding will exceed 80%. It is an admitted fact that the total shareholding of the PSU is 45% and this is sufficient enough to bring it within the definition of the term “substantial finance”. We may agree that the LICHFL is not owned by LIC of India as the total shareholding of the LIC does not exceed 50% but there can be no doubt that LIC and other insurance companies and banks taken together have financed LICHFL substantially." The CIC relied upon a decision of Madras High Court to observe that "it is not necessary that the Government should be the majority shareholder of the Public Authority. The body or institution should be substantially financed by the Government and they should be controlled by the Government. Whether or not the government exercises such control or not is immaterial."

In respect of LIC Mutual Fund Assets Management Co. Limited, the CIC dismissed its contention observing thus; 

"The LIC of India is a body established, constituted, owned and controlled by Central Government which is the Appropriate Government for the LIC of India and the funding by LIC of India and their general control over the functioning of the LIC Mutual Fund can be nothing but an indirect funding and control by the Appropriate Government. LIC of India is a public authority having been constituted by an Act of Parliament. LIC of India in turn in order to further carry out their public function have formed LIC Mutual Fund approved for formation “through subsidiary” which has to function under LIC’s control. The respondent Mutual Fund is fully financed and administratively controlled by the LIC of India through a Board of Trustees. The trustees of the Board who manage the LIC Mutual Fund are appointed with the approval of LIC of India. LIC of India has the power to change the Trustees from time to time. The corpus of the Trust amounting to Rs.10 lakhs was contributed by the LIC. The Trust Deed provides that a further sum not exceeding Rs.25 crores shall be made available as initial contribution to the Trust by the LIC. The LIC has floated the Mutual Fund to mop up the additional savings from the public in rural and semi-urban areas and it would be receiving considerable amount of insurance business from the Mutual Fund. LIC of India for the above purpose provides to the Mutual Fund all suitable help and guidance which includes payment of initial corpus of the Trust, financial assistance to the Trust, renting out premises after housing the Mutual Fund, provision of initial office equipment and deputation of suitable employees etc. The Chairman of LIC is authorized to take such administrative decisions as may be required periodically so as to ensure the smooth launching of the LIC Mutual Fund and its successful operation."

Finding the position of G.I.C. Housing Finance Limited no different, the CIC concluded that "shareholding of six Public Authorities in GIC Housing Finance is 47.68% and coupled with the control they exercise over the GIC Housing Finance is sufficient to bring them within the ambit of the definition of “Public Authority” as defined in Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005."

Have a look at the decision.

Tenant can be evicted for sub-leasing: Supreme Court

In a recent decision, the Supreme Court has declared that sub-leasing of the plot by the tenant is a valid ground for seeking eviction of the tenant. It was argued before the Court that the landlord had given a premises on rent to the tenant to run a grocery shop whereas "the tenant without permission or consent of the landlord has transferred/sublet tenancy interest in the premises" and "transferee/sub-lessee is exclusively running the business in the said rented premises and that no grocery shop is being run by the tenant in the said premises." The tenant argued that being of advanced age, he was not doing good business in grocery and therefore formed a partnership with his son and daughter in law to run a new business as a travel agency and the premises had been sub-let to the new partnership.

The Supreme Court referred to the local enactment which specifically recognized eviction of the tenant if he transferred his right under the lease or sub-let it to another person without the written consent of the landlord. In order to ascertain the meaning of sub-leasing, the Court referred to its earlier decision in Gopal Saran vs. Satyanarayana (1989) 3 SCC 56 to define sub-letting 'transfer of an exclusive right to enjoy the property in favour of the third party' and that "to prove sub-tenancy, two ingredients have to be established, firstly, the tenant must have exclusive right of possession or interests in the premises or part of the premises in question and secondly, the right must be in lieu of payment of some compensation or rent."

Referring further to another earlier decision in Parvinder Singh v. Renu Gautam (2004) 4 SCC 794 which decided on an almost similar situation, the Court quoted the following paragraphs from the earlier decision;

The rent control legislations which extend many a protection to the tenant, also provide for grounds of eviction. One such ground, most common in all the legislations, is sub-letting or parting with possession of the tenancy premises by the tenant. Rent control laws usually protect the tenant so long as he may himself use the premises but not his transferee inducted into possession of the premises, in breach of the contract or the law, which act is often done with the object of illegitimate profiteering or rack-renting. To defeat the provisions of law, a device is at times adopted by unscrupulous tenants and sub-tenants of bringing into existence a deed of partnership which gives the relationship of tenant and sub-tenant an outward appearance of partnership while in effect what has come into existence is a sub-tenancy or parting with possession camouflaged under the cloak of partnership. Merely because a tenant has entered into a partnership he cannot necessarily be held to have sub-let the premises or parted with possession thereof in favour of his partners. If the tenant is actively associated with the partnership business and retains the use and control over the tenancy premises with him, maybe along with the partners, the tenant may not be said to have parted with possession. However, if the user and control of the tenancy premises has been parted with and deed of partnership has been drawn up as an indirect method of collecting the consideration for creation of sub-tenancy or for providing a cloak or cover to conceal a transaction not permitted by law, the court is not estopped from tearing the veil of partnership and finding out the real nature of transaction entered into between the tenant and the alleged sub-tenant. A person having secured a lease of premises for the purpose of his business may be in need of capital or finance or someone to assist him in his business and to achieve such like purpose he may enter into partnership with strangers. Quite often partnership is entered into between the members of any family as a part of tax planning. There is no stranger brought on the premises. So long as the premises remain in occupation of the tenant or in his control, a mere entering into partnership may not provide a ground for eviction by running into conflict with prohibition against sub-letting or parting with possession. This is a general statement of law which ought to be read in the light of the lease agreement and the law governing the tenancy. There are cases wherein the tenant sub-lets the premises or parts with possession in defiance of the terms of lease or the rent control legislation and in order to save himself from the peril of eviction brings into existence, a deed of partnership between him and his sub-lessee to act as a cloak on the reality of the transaction. The existence of deed of partnership between the tenant and the alleged sub-tenant would not preclude the landlord from bringing on record material and circumstances, by adducing evidence or by means of cross-examination, making out a case of subletting or parting with possession or interest in tenancy premises by the tenant in favour of a third person. The rule as to exclusion of oral by documentary evidence governs the parties to the deed in writing. A stranger to the document is not bound by the terms of the document and is, therefore, not excluded from demonstrating the untrue or collusive nature of the document or the fraudulent or illegal purpose for which it was brought into being. An enquiry into reality of transaction is not excluded merely by availability of writing reciting the transaction."

Referring to other decisions on the aspect, the Supreme Court summarised the legal position as under;

(i) In order to prove mischief of subletting as a ground for eviction under rent control laws, two ingredients have to be established, (one) parting with possession of tenancy or part of it by tenant in favour of a third party with exclusive right of possession and (two) that such parting with possession has been done without the consent of the landlord and in lieu of compensation or rent.

(ii) Inducting a partner or partners in the business or profession by a tenant by itself does not amount to subletting. However, if the purpose of such partnership is ostensible and a deed of partnership is drawn to conceal the real transaction of sub-letting, the court may tear the veil of partnership to find out the real nature of transaction entered into by the tenant.

(iii) The existence of deed of partnership between tenant and alleged sub-tenant or ostensible transaction in any other form would not preclude the landlord from bringing on record material and circumstances, by adducing evidence or by means of cross-examination, making out a case of sub-letting or parting with possession in tenancy premises by the tenant in favour of a third person.

(iv) If tenant is actively associated with the partnership business and retains the control over the tenancy premises with him, may be along with partners, the tenant may not be said to have parted with possession.

(v) Initial burden of proving subletting is on landlord but once he is able to establish that a third party is in exclusive possession of the premises and that tenant has no legal possession of the tenanted premises, the onus shifts to tenant to prove the nature of occupation of such third party and that he (tenant) continues to hold legal possession in tenancy premises.

(vi) In other words, initial burden lying on landlord would stand discharged by adducing prima facie proof of the fact that a party other than tenant was in exclusive possession of the premises. A presumption of sub-letting may then be raised and would amount to proof unless rebutted.

In view of the aforesaid legal position, declared that "if the purpose of constituting partnership by the tenant is ostensible and a deed of partnership is drawn to conceal the real transaction of subletting in a given case, the court may be required to tear the veil of partnership to find out the real nature of transaction entered into by the tenant and in such circumstances the evidence let in by the landlord cannot be ignored on the ground that there is some variance between pleading and proof" and being of such view, upheld the original order of the Rent Control Tribunal allowing eviction of the tenant. Have a look at the decision. 

Supreme Court judges declare assets

What had created a furore in the higher judiciary has now come a full circle with the Supreme Court judges declaring their assets as promised. Though the Chief Justice of India has always maintained that his office is not within the purview of the Right to Information Act (and therefore will not abide by the directive of the Central Information Commission [CIC] to provide information), the Court has "on a voluntary basis" declared the assets of its judges on its website today.

Though we had covered the entire chronology leading to the events, just a quick recap would lead us to the decision of the CIC which had directed the Registrar of Supreme Court to inform the applicant whether the Supreme Court and High Court judges had been filing declaration in terms of the Full Bench resolution of 1997 whereunder the judges had undertaken to file a list of assets to the respective Chief Justice. The petition challenging the decision of CIC (filed at the behest of the Supreme Court and argued by the Attorney General of India himself) was turned down by a Single judge of the Delhi High Court in an elaborate decision. The further challenge to this ruling had been referred by the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court to a larger bench of the High Court being of the view that important questions of law were involved and therefore a determinative finding is required.

In the meanwhile, considering the public opinion and the pending bill to similar effect in the Parliament, the judges of various High Court and finally the Supreme Court undertook to voluntarily disclose their assets. And now, a special link has been created on the website of the Supreme Court where the assets of most of the Supreme Court judges have been enlisted. The declaratory statement, however, is quick to point out that "the declaration of assets is purely on voluntary basis" which clearly shows the intent of the court to continue to press upon the legal challenge as to its amenability under the Right to Information Act. 

Let us hope that, say on a similar voluntary basis, other public servants would be pleased to follow the lead and come out and support the transparency initiative.

Revisiting 'Principles of Judicial Conduct'

Certain past events in the judicial circles have drawn a lot of furore and criticism on the conduct of the judges. The situation is, however, not new. Given the enormity of stakes involved and the continuous media coverage of events, it is but obvious that issues can be raked up to the extent of requiring the judge to recuse himself of the case. But then one cannot decide the propriety of the conduct on a case to case to basis. Evolution of universal standards are required at a axiomatic level to test the veracity of the accusatory claims and vouch-safe the conduct of the judge. This is not only important for ensuring that parties continue to repose their faith in the judicial system but also to accentuate into reality the fundamental underlying principle of law that 'justice must only be done but also seem to be done'. The course of time has, indeed, witnessed the evolution of such standards and in this post we undertake a stock-taking of the various principles which have been evolved to test and improve the propriety of conduct of the judges. 


The then Chief Justice of India in 2007, delivering the M.C. Setalvad Memorial Lecture titled 'Canons of Judicial Ethics' discussed these principles and the need for them to be followed consistenly in his lecture. However the formal note on this accord had already been struck ten years back when on 7th of May in 1997, a full bench of the Supreme Court of India adopted the 'Restatement of Judicial Values' as the bench-mark conduct to be observed by the judges of the country which extends 16 principles as under; 

1. Justice must not merely be done but it must also be seen to be done. The behaviour and conduct of members of the higher judiciary must reaffirm the people’s faith in the impartiality of the judiciary. Accordingly any act of the judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court, whether in official or personal capacity, which erodes the credibility of this perception has to be avoided.

2. A judge should not contest the election to any office of a club, society or other association; further he shall not hold such elective office except in a society or association connected with the law.

3. Close association with individual members of the Bar, particularly those who practice in the same court, shall be eschewed.

4. A judge shall not permit any member of his immediate family, such as spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law or daughter-in-law or any other close relative, if a member of the Bar, to appear before him or even be associated in any manner with a cause to be dealt with by him.

5. No member of his family, who is a member of the Bar, shall be permitted to use the residence in which the Judge actually resides or other facilities for processional work.

6. A Judge should practise a degree of aloofness consistent with the dignity of his office.

7. A Judge shall not hear and decide a matter in which a member of his family, a close relation or a friend is concerned.

8. A Judge shall not enter into public debate or express his views in public on political matters that are pending or are likely to arise for judicial determination.

9. A Judge is expected to let his judgments speak for themselves. He shall not give interview to the media.

10. A Judge shall not accept gifts or hospitality except from his family, close relations and friends.

11. A Judge shall not hear and decide a matter in a company in which he holds shares is concerned unless he has disclosed his interest and no objection to his hearing and deciding the matter is raised.

12. A Judge shall not speculate in shares, stocks or the like.

13. A Judge shall not engage directly or indirectly in trade or business, either by himself or in association with any other person. (Publication of a legal treatise or any activity in the nature of a hobby shall not be construed as a trade or business).

14. A Judge should not ask for, accept contributions or otherwise actively associate himself with the raising of any fund for any purpose.

15. A Judge should not seek any financial benefit in the form of a perquisite or privilege attached to his office unless it is clearly available. Any doubt in this behalf must be got resolved and clarified through the Chief Justice.

16. Every Judge must at all times be conscious that he is under the public gauze and there should be no act or omission by him which is unbecoming of the high office he occupies and the public esteem in which that office is held.

There is no shortage of international institutions dedicated to the cause of promoting judicial accountability. Way back in 1982 itself the International Bar Association adopted its declaration on 'Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence'. This was followed by the adoption of the 'UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary' by a United Nations organ in 1985.

The United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights thereafter appointed in 1994 a seemingly permanent position of 'Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers' which has even since been continually monitoring and carrying out the mandate entrusted to it which inter alia includes the task "to identify and record not only attacks on the independence of the judiciary, lawyers and court officials but also progress achieved in protecting and enhancing their independence, and make concrete recommendations, including the provision of advisory services or technical assistance when they are requested by the State concerned" and also "To identify ways and means to improve the judicial system, and make concrete recommendations thereon". The appointment of the Rapporteur is based upon the firm conviction of the UN Human Rights Council to this effect that which notes the background of such appointment, being "convinced that an independent and impartial judiciary, an independent legal profession and the integrity of the judicial system are essential prerequisites for the protection of human rights and for ensuring that there is no discrimination in the administration of justice".

The Centre for International Crime Prevention of the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention organised a Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity which in its report of 2000 suggested a number of measures to check judicial corruption. The Center for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers of the 'International Commission of Jurists' is another institution "established in 1978, works to promote and protect judicial and legal independence and impartiality through a variety of means. The CIJL bases its work on the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary and the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, and was instrumental in their formulation."

Having so said and done, however, the undisputed international benchmark are the 'Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct' which were adopted by the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace Palace at The Hague in Netherlands in November, 2002. The formal text adopting these principles extends the rationale for adopting of these principles as under;

THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES are intended to establish standards for ethical conduct of judges. They are designed to provide guidance to judges and to afford the judiciary a framework for regulating judicial conduct. They are also intended to assist members of the executive and the legislature, and lawyers and the public in general, to better understand and support the judiciary. These principles presuppose that judges are accountable for their conduct to appropriate institutions established to maintain judicial standards, which are themselves independent and impartial, and are intended to supplement and not to derogate from existing rules of law and conduct which bind the judge.

These principles are broadly based six 'values' which are explained in principle in the text and thereon with a further detail on their application which can broaded be restated as under;

Value 1: INDEPENDENCE

Principle: Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.

Value 2: IMPARTIALITY

Principle: Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

Value 3: INTEGRITY

Principle: Integrity is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. 

Value 4: PROPRIETY

Principle: Propriety, and the appearance of propriety, are essential to the performance of all of the activities of a judge.

Value 5: EQUALITY

Principle: Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the judicial office.

Value 6: COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

Principle: Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.

These Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, in as much as they are based upon and a consolidating act of all earlier international codes and instruments on the the issue, can at best be described as the international norm holding the field. For example, these principles have been adopted by the UN Economic and Social Council and the American Bar Association whereas the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and Judicial Integrity Group have released their own version of elaborate Commentary of the Bangalore principles.

Thus, on a survey of codes and instruments issued to this effect, one finds that the arena seems to be fully occupied in as much as the characterization and precision with which the role of a judge has been defined. However what remains and the area which can be further worked upon is in the direction of the effective implementation of these standards to the justice dispensation system effectuated by the judges.