Cross examination by court: The law revisited

In a recently reported decision [M/s. Kapil Corepacks Pvt.Ltd. v. Harbans Lal, AIR 2010 SC 2809], the Supreme Court has clarified the scope of examination of a witness by the Court. Reflecting in the context of the power of a court to cross-examine a witness in terms of Rule 2 of Order 10 of Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court clarified the law in the following terms;

8. The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave. On the contentions urged by the learned counsel, the following questions arise for our consideration:

(i ) What is the scope and ambit of Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code? 

(ii) Whether the court could, in an examination under Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code, confront a defendant with only the signature portion of a disputed unexhibited document filed by the plaintiff (by covering the remaining portions of the document) and require him to identify the seal/stamp and signature?

(iii) Whether on the basis of the answer given by a party, in response to a question under Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code, the court could prosecute him under Section 340 of Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 195 of the Indian Penal Code?

Re : Question (i)

9. We may first advert to the relevant provisions. Rule 2 of Order 10 of the Code as also Rules 1 and 3 are relevant and they are extracted below : 

“ORDER 10 – EXAMIANTION OF PARTIES BY THE COURT

1. Ascertainment whether allegations in pleadings are admitted or denied-
At the first hearing of the suit the Court shall ascertain from each party or his pleader whether he admits or denies such allegations of fact as are made in the plaint or written statement (if any) of the opposite party, and as are not expressly or by necessary implication admitted or denied by the party against whom they are made. The Court shall record such admissions and denials.
2. Oral examination of party, or companion of party --
(1) At the first hearing of the suit, the Court-
(a) shall, with a view to elucidating matters in controversy in the suit examine orally such of the parties to the suit appearing in person or present in Court, as it deems fit; and
(b) may orally examine any person, able to answer any material question relating to the suit, by whom any party appearing in person or present in Court or his pleader is accompanied.
(2) At any subsequent hearing, the Court may orally examine any party appearing in person or present in Court, or any person, able to answer any material question relating to the suit, by whom such party or his pleader is accompanied.
(3) The Court may, if it thinks fit, put in the course of an examination under this rule questions suggested by either party.
3. Substance of examination to be written --
The substance of the examination shall be reduced to writing by the Judge, and shall form part of the record.”

10. Rule 1 enables the court to ascertain from each of the parties (or his pleader), at the first hearing whether he admits or denies such of those allegations of fact made in the pleadings of the other party, which were not expressly or by necessary implication admitted or denied by him. In other words, if the defendant in his written statement fails to expressly or by necessary implication admit or deny any of the plaint allegations, the court can ascertain from the defendant, whether he admits or denies the said plaint allegations. Similarly, if the defendant has made some allegations against the plaintiff in his written statement, and no reply is filed thereto by the plaintiff, the court can ascertain whether plaintiff admits or denies those allegations. Resort to Rule 1 of Order 10 is necessary only in cases where the court finds that the plaintiff or the defendant has failed to expressly or impliedly admit or deny any of the allegations made against him, by the other party. Examination under Order 10 Rule 1 of the Code will not be necessary where the pleadings of each party have been fully and clearly traversed by the other party.

11. On the other hand, the examination under Rule 2 of Order 10 of the Code, need not be restricted to allegations in the pleadings of the other party, but can relate to elucidating any matter in controversy in the suit. Further, under Rule 1 of Order 10, the court can examine only the parties and their advocates, that too at the ‘first hearing’. On the other hand, Rule 2 enables the court to examine not only any party, but also any person accompanying either party or his pleader, to obtain answer to any material question relating to the suit, either at the first hearing or subsequent hearings. The object of oral examination under Rule 2 of Order 10 is to ascertain the matters in controversy in suit, and not to record evidence or to secure admissions. The statement made by a party in an examination under Rule 2 is not under oath, and is not intended to be a substitute for a regular examination under oath under Order 18 of the Code. It is intended to elucidate what is obscure and vague in the pleadings. In other words, while the purpose of an examination under Rule 1 is to clarify the stand of a party in regard to the allegations made against him in the pleadings of the other party, the purpose of the oral examination under Rule 2 is mainly to elucidate the allegations even in his own pleadings, or any documents filed with the pleadings. The power under Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code, cannot be converted into a process of  elective cross-examination by the court, before the party has an opportunity to put forth his case at the trial.

12. The above position of law is well settled. We need refer only to two decisions in this behalf. In Manmohan Das v. Mt. Ramdei & Anr. [AIR 1931 PC 175], the Privy Council observed:

“No doubt under Order 10, Rule 2, any party present  in Court may be examined orally by the Court at any stage of the hearing, and the Court may if it thinks fit put in the course of such examination questions suggested by either party. But this power is intended to be used by the Judge only when he finds it necessary to obtain from such party information on any material questions relating to the suit and ought not to be employed so as to supersede the ordinary  procedure at trial as prescribed in Order 18.”

A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Arunagiri Goundan v. Vasantharoya Koundan & Ors (AIR 1949 Madras 707), held as follows referring to Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code :

“At the outset it must be pointed out that this (Order 10 Rule 2) does not provide for an examination on oath. This provision was intended to be used to elucidate the matters in controversy in suit before the trial began. This is not a provision intended to be used to supersede the usual procedure to be followed at the trial.”

13. The object of Order 10 Rule 2 is not to elicit admissions. Nor does it provide for or contemplate admissions. The admissions are usually contemplated (i) in the pleadings (express or constructive under Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code); (ii) during examination of a party by the court under Order 10 Rule 1 of the Code; (iii) in answers to interrogatories under Order 11 Rule 8 of the Code; (iv) in response to notice to admit facts under Order 12 Rule 4 of the Code; (v) in any evidence or in an affidavit, on oath; and (vi) when any party voluntarily comes forward during the pendency of a suit or proceedings to make an admission.

14. The power of court to call upon a party to admit any document and record whether the party admits or refuses or neglects to admit such document is traceable to Order 12 Rule 3A rather than Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code. Nothing however comes in the way of the court combining the power under Order 12 Rule 3A with its power under Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code and calling upon a party to admit any document when a Party is being examined under Order 10 Rule 2. But the court can only call upon a party to admit any document and cannot cross-examine a party with reference to a document.

Re : Question No.(ii)

15. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that confronting the signature portion of a disputed document by covering up the remaining portions, is a tool in the arsenal of the cross examining counsel. He submitted that the court examining a party under Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code while purporting to elucidate the matters in controversy, cannot confront the signature portion of a disputed unexhibited document by adopting the procedure of covering up the other portions of the agreement. 

16. The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that the power of the court under Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code, to examine any party with reference to any document is wide and unrestricted and therefore, any procedure adopted to arrive at the truth, could not be said to be a deviation from the normal examination under Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code. He relied upon the decisions of several High Courts in support of his contention that the court could confront a party with a document and seek his admission in respect of its execution. The decisions relied upon are : Bhanwarlal Kavad v. Shyamsunder [AIR 1984 Raj. 113], Amrita Devi v. Sripat Rai [AIR 1962 All. 111], Rajiv Srivastava v. Sanjiv Tuli [AIR 2005 Del. 319] and Gautam Adani v. Container Corporation of India [150 (2008) DLT 281]. On a careful consideration of these decisions, we find that they are not of any assistance in this case.

16.1) In Bhanwar Lal Kavad (supra), a learned Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court held:

“In my opinion the court should resort to the examination of the parties under Rule 2, particularly on the documents, which are said to be signed by the parties. …. it is better that the original documents are put to the party and admission or denial is obtained after visual observations by the party himself of the original documents. After looking into the documents, the party would be in a position to admit or deny the same, which would not be possible, if the same is got done by his pleader.”

16.2) Learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Amrita Devi (supra) and the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Rajiv Srivastava (supra) held that an admission made by a party under Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code is conclusive against him, and the court can proceed to pass judgment on the basis of such admission.

16.3) In Gautam Adani (supra), a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court referred to the scope of Order 10 Rule 2 thus:

“…..we are of the view that examination of the parties is a matter that is per se intended not so much for determining any right or obligation in the suit or resolving or adjudicating upon a controversy as it is for identifying the precise area of controversy so that the same can be effectively adjudicated upon. The distinction between any order which adjudicates upon a controversy or a part thereof and another which simply attempts to identify the real area in controversy cannot be lost sight of. Inasmuch as the impugned order directed the defendants to remain present for recording their statements under Order 10 Rule 2, it was an attempt to identify the real issues in controversy and to elucidate matters which, in the opinion of the learned Single Judge, required to be elucidated.”

16.4) None of these decisions assists the respondents. Bhanwar Lal Kavad recognizes the power of the court to call upon a party to admit a document. Amrita Devi and Rajiv Srivastava reiterate the position that if a party makes an admission of fact, it will be binding on him. Gautam Adani supports the contention of the appellants that the scope of Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code is limited to identifying the matters in controversy and not to adjudicate upon the matters in controversy. 

17. The object of the examination under Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code is to identify the matters in controversy and not to prove or disprove the matters in controversy, nor to seek admissions, nor to decide the rights or obligations of parties. If the court had merely asked the second appellant whether he had executed the agreement/receipt or not, by showing him the document (by marking the document for purposes of identification only and not as an exhibit), it might have been possible to justify it as examination under Order 10 Rule 2 read with Order 12 Rule 3A of the Code. But any attempt by the Court, to either to prove or disprove a document or to cross-examine a party by adopting the stratagem of covering portions of a document used by cross-examining counsel, are clearly outside the scope of an examination under Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code and the power to call upon a party to admit any document under Order 12 Rule 3A of the Code. What the High Court has done in this case is to ‘cross-examine’ the second appellant and not examine him as contemplated under Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code. We therefore hold that the purported examination under Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code, by confronting a party only with a signature on a disputed and unexhibited document by adopting the process of covering the remaining portions thereof is impermissible, being beyond the scope of an examination under Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code.

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Fraud vitiates all: The law revisited

Common law principles are largely based upon equitable doctrines. Some of these doctrines have become the core foundations of justice dispensation system in jurisdictions which have adopted these common law concepts. We had the occasion to earlier write upon the doctrine that one much approach the court with clean hands and that lack of truth in litigation was not appreciable. We bring to you the law relating to a related concept that 'fraud vitiates all' which is deeply embedded in the common law tradition which India follows.

The Supreme Court of India in a recent decision [Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy] explained the concept in the following terms;

20. It is settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an order/office by making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent Authority, such order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. “Fraud avoids all judicial acts ecclesiastical or temporal.” (Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. AIR 1994 SC 853). In Lazarus Estate Ltd. Vs. Besalay 1956 All. E.R. 349), the Court observed without equivocation that “no judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels everything.”

21. In Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation Vs. M/s. GAR Re-Rolling Mills & Anr. AIR 1994 SC 2151; and State of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Prabhu (1994) 2 SCC 481. this Court observed that a writ Court, while exercising its equitable jurisdiction, should not act as to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud as the courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith. “Equity is, also, known to prevent the law from the crafty evasions and sub-letties invented to evade law.”

22. In Smt. Shrisht Dhawan Vs. M/s. Shaw Brothers. AIR 1992 SC 1555, it has been held as under:–

“Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct.”

23. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rajendra Singh & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1165, this Court observed that “Fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries. 

24. The ratio laid down by this Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played fraud or made misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud. (See District Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society, Vizianagaram & Anr. Vs. M. Tripura Sundari Devi (1990) 3 SCC 655; Union of India & Ors. Vs. M. Bhaskaran (1995) Suppl. 4 SCC 100; Vice Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Anr. Vs. Girdharilal Yadav (2004) 6 SCC 325; State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash Babulalsing Parmar (2007) 1 SCC 80; Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. Vs. Coal Tar Refining Company AIR 2007 SC 2798; and Mohammed Ibrahim & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2009) 8 SCC 751).

25. Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an egregious nature would vitiate the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The expression “fraud” involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. (Vide Dr. Vimla Vs. Delhi Administration AIR 1963 SC 1572; Indian Bank Vs. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 550; State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. T. Suryachandra Rao AIR 2005 SC 3110; K.D. Sharma Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. (2008) 12 SCC 481; and Regional Manager, Central Bank of India Vs. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir & Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 170).

26. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Suppression of a material document would also amount to a fraud on the court. (Vide S.P. Changalvaraya Naidu (supra); Gowrishankar & Anr. Vs. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 2202; Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Savitri Devi & Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 319; Roshan Deen Vs. Preeti Lal AIR 2002 SC 33; Ram Preeti Yadav Vs. U.P. Board of High School & Intermediate Education AIR 2003 SC 4628; and Ashok Leyland Ltd. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. AIR 2004 SC 2836). 

27. In kinch Vs. Walcott (1929) AC 482, it has been held that “….mere constructive fraud is not, at all events after long delay, sufficient but such a judgment will not be set aside upon mere proof that the judgment was obtained y perjury.” Thus, detection/discovery of constructive fraud at a much belated stage may not be sufficient to set aside the judgment procured by perjury.

28. From the above, it is evident that even in judicial proceedings, once a fraud is proved, all advantages gained by playing fraud can be taken away. In such an eventuality the questions of non-executing of the statutory remedies or statutory bars like doctrine of res judicata are not attracted. Suppression of any material fact/document amounts to a fraud on the court. Every court has an inherent power to recall its own order obtained by fraud as the order so obtained is non est.

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'Vesting' of land with State: The concept understood

In a recent decision [Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport] the Supreme Court has explained the concept relating to vesting of land with the State. Holding that the State acquired the land free of any encumbrances and becomes the absolute owner thereof, there was no right with the previous holder except to sue for compensation.

The Supreme Court inter alia observed as under;

9. The meaning of the word ‘vesting’ has been considered by this Court time and again. In The Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union Vs. The Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344, this Court held that the meaning of word ‘vesting’ varies as per the context of the Statute in which the property vests. While considering the case under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act 1894, the Court held as under:–

“…the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any condition or limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration.” 

10. “Encumbrance” actually means the burden caused by an act or omission of man and not that created by nature. It means a burden or charge upon property or a claim or lien on the land. It means a legal liability on property. Thus, it constitutes a burden on the title which diminishes the value of the land. It may be a mortgage or a deed of trust or a lien of an easement. An encumbrance, thus, must be a charge on the property. It must run with the property. (Vide Collector of Bombay Vs. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri & Ors., AIR 1955 SC 298; H.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. Vs. Shiv K. Sharma & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 954; and AI Champdany Industries Ltd. Vs. Official Liquidator & Anr., (2009) 4 SCC 486).

11. In State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Tarsem Singh & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 3431, this Court held that the terminology ‘free from all encumbrances’ used in Section 16 of the Act 1894, is wholly unqualified and would en-compass the extinguishing of “all rights, title and interests including easementary rights” when the title vests in the State. Thus, “free from encumbrances” means vesting of land in the State without any charge or burden in it. Thus, State has absolute title/ownership over it.

12. In Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2517, this Court held that once land vests in the State free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested. The same view has been reiterated in Awadh Bihari Yadav & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 31; U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow Vs. M/s. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 1170; Pratap & Anr. (Supra); Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 405; Allahabad Development Authority Vs. Nasiruzzaman & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 424; State of Kerala & Ors. Vs. M. Bhaskaran Pillai & Anr., AIR 1997 SC 2703; M. Ramalinga Thevar Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (2000) 4 SCC 322; Printers (Mysore) Ltd. Vs. M.A. Rasheed & Ors., (2004) 4 SCC 460; Bangalore Development Authority & Ors. Vs. R. Hanumaiah & Ors., (2005) 12 SCC 508; and Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. Vs. Syed Akbar, AIR 2005 SC 492. 

13. So far as the change of user is concerned, it is a settled legal proposition that once land vests in the State free from all encumbrances, there cannot be any rider on the power of the State Government to change user of the land in the manner it chooses. In a similar situation, in Gulam Mustafa & Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 448, this Court held as under:–

“Once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring Authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the.......declaration.” 

14. Re-iterating a similar view in C. Padma & Ors. Vs. Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (1997) 2 SCC 627, this Court held that if by virtue of a valid acquisition of land, land stands vested in the State, thereafter, claimants are not entitled to restoration of possession on the grounds that either the original public purpose is ceased to be in operation or the land could not be used for any other purposes.

15. In Bhagat Singh etc. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 436; Niladri Narayan Chandradhurja Vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 2002 SC 2532; and Northern Indian Glass Industries Vs. Jaswant Singh & Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 335, this Court held that, the land user can be changed by the Statutory Authority after the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances.

16. In view of the above, the law can be summarised that once the land is acquired, it vests in the State free from all encumbrances. It is not the concern of the land owner how his land is used and whether the land is being used for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other purpose. He becomes persona non grata once the land vests in the State. He has a right to get compensation only for the same. The person interested cannot claim the right of restoration of land on any ground, whatsoever.

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Freedom of Speech versus Contempt of Court: The law revisited

Holding that somewhere the line has to be drawn between the exercise of the freedom of speech and expression and the law relating to contempt of court, the Supreme Court in a recent decision [Indirect Tax Practitioners Association v. R.K. Jain] dismissed the contempt petition against a publisher of a law journal for alleged contempt of a tax tribunal committed by him in terms of the articles/editorials published in the law journal. 

Justice G.S. Singhvi, speaking for the Bench, inter alia defined the dividing line the following terms;

14. Before adverting to the second and more important issue, we deem it necessary to remind ourselves that freedom of speech and expression has always been considered as the most cherished right of every human being. Justice Brennan of U.S. Supreme Court, while dealing with a case of libel – New York Times Company v. L.B. Sullivan observed that “it is a prized privilege to speak one’s mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions and this opportunity should be afforded for vigorous advocacy no less than abstract discussion.” In all civilized societies, the Courts have exhibited high degree of tolerance and accepted adverse comments and criticism of their orders/judgments even though, at times, such criticism is totally off the mark and the language used is inappropriate. The right of a member of the public to criticize the functioning of a judicial institution has been beautifully described by the Privy Council in Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago AIR 1936 PC 141 in the following words: 

“No wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticizing in good faith in private or public the public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism is a public way: the wrongheaded are permitted to err therein: provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken comments of ordinary men.”

In Debi Prasad Sharma v. The King Emperor AIR 1943 PC 202, Lord Atkin speaking on behalf of the Judicial Committee observed: 

“In 1899 this Board pronounced proceedings for this species of contempt (scandalization) to be obsolete in this country, though surviving in other parts of the Empire, but they added that it is a weapon to be used sparingly and always with reference to the administration of Justice: McLeod v. St. Auhyn. In In re a Special Reference from the Bahama Islands the test applied by the very strong Board which heard the reference was whether the words complained of were in the circumstances calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice and the due administration of the law. In Queen v. Gray it was shown that the offence of scandalizing the court itself was not obsolete in this country. A very scandalous attack had been made on a Judge for his judicial utterances while sitting in a criminal case on circuit, and it was with the foregoing opinions on record that Lord Russell of Killowen, C.J., adopting the expression of Wilmot, C.J., in his opinion in Rex v. Almon which is the source of much of the present law on the subject, spoke of the article complained of as calculated to lower the authority of the Judge.”

In Regina v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1968) 2 All ER 319, Lord Denning observed: 

‘‘Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it to suppress those who speak against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself. 

It is the right of every man, in Parliament or out of it, in the press or over the broadcast, to make fair comment, even outspoken comment, on matters of public interest. Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done in a court of justice. They can say that we are mistaken, and our decisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal or not. All we would ask is that those who criticise us will remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to their criticisms. We cannot enter into public controversy. Still less into political controversy. We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication.

Exposed as we are to the winds of criticism, nothing which is said by this person or that, nothing which is written by this pen or that, will deter us from doing what we believe is right; nor, I would add, from saying what the occasion requires, provided that it is pertinent to the matter in hand. Silence is not an option when things are ill done.’’

15. In the land of Gautam Buddha, Mahavir and Mahatma Gandhi, the freedom of speech and expression and freedom to speak one’s mind have always been respected. After independence, the Courts have zealously guarded this most precious freedom of every human being. Fair criticism of the system of administration of justice or functioning of institutions or authorities entrusted with the task of deciding rights of the parties gives an opportunity to the operators of the system/institution to remedy the wrong and also bring about improvements. Such criticism cannot be castigated as an attempt to scandalize or lower the authority of the Court or other judicial institutions or as an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice except when such criticism is ill motivated or is construed as a deliberate attempt to run down the institution or an individual Judge is targeted for extraneous reasons. Ordinarily, the Court would not use the power to punish for contempt for curbing the right of freedom of speech and expression, which is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Only when the criticism of judicial institutions transgresses all limits of decency and fairness or there is total lack of objectivity or there is deliberate attempt to denigrate the institution then the Court would use this power. The judgments of this Court in Re S. Mulgaokar (1978) 3 SCC 339 and P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker (1988) 3 SCC 167 are outstanding examples of this attitude and approach. In the first case, a three-Judge Bench considered the question of contempt by newspaper article published in Indian Express dated 13.12.1977 criticising the Judges of this Court. The article noted that the High Courts had strongly reacted to the proposal of introducing a code of judicial ethics and propriety. In its issue dated December 21, 1977 an article entitled “behaving like a Judge” was published which inter alia stated that the Supreme Court of India was “packed” by Mrs Indira Gandhi “with pliant and submissive judges except for a few”. It was further stated that the suggestion that a code of ethics should be formulated by judges themselves was “so utterly inimical to the independence of the judiciary, violative of the constitutional safeguards in that respect and offensive to the self-respect of the judges as to make one wonder how it was conceived in the first place”. A notice had been issued to the Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper to show cause why proceedings for contempt under Article 129 of the Constitution should not be initiated against him in respect of the above two news items. After examining the submissions made at the Bar, the Court dropped the contempt proceedings. Beg, C.J., expressed his views in the following words:

“Some people perhaps believe that attempts to hold trials of everything and everybody by publications in newspapers must include those directed against the highest Court of Justice in this country and its pronouncements. If this is done in a reasonable manner, which pre-supposes accuracy of information about a matter on which any criticism is offered, and arguments are directed fairly against any reasoning adopted, I would, speaking for myself, be the last person to consider it objectionable even if some criticism offered is erroneous. In Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, I had said (at p. 828) (SCC pp. 827-28):

“John Stuart Mill, in his  essay on ‘Liberty’, pointed out the need for allowing even erroneous opinions to be expressed on the ground that the correct ones become more firmly established by what may be called the ‘dialectical’ process of a struggle with wrong ones which exposes errors. Milton, in his ‘Areopagitica’ (1644) said:

Though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; whoever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?... Who knows not that Truth is strong, next to the Almighty; she needs no policies, no stratagems, no licensings to make her victorious; those are the shifts and defences that error makes against her power ....”

Political philosophers and historians have taught us that intellectual advances made by our civilisation would have been impossible without freedom of speech and expression. At any rate, political democracy is based on the assumption that such freedom must be jealously guarded. Voltaire expressed a democrat’s faith when he told, an adversary in arguments : “I do not agree with a word you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it”. Champions of human freedom of thought and expression throughout the ages, have realised that intellectual paralysis creeps over a society which denies, in however subtle a form, due freedom of thought and expression to its members.

“Although, our Constitution does not contain a separate guarantee of Freedom of the Press, apart from the freedom of expression and opinion contained in Article 19(l)(a) of the Constitution, yet, it is well-recognised that the Press provides the principal vehicle of expression of their views to citizens. It has been said:

“Freedom of the Press is the Ark of the Covenant of Democracy because public criticism is essential to the working of its institutions. Never has criticism been more necessary than today, when the weapons of propaganda are so strong and so subtle. But, like other liberties, this also must be limited.” 

Krishna Iyer, J. agreed with C.J. Beg and observed:

“Poise and peace and inner harmony are so quintessential to the judicial temper that huff, “haywire” or even humiliation shall not besiege; nor, unveracious provocation, frivolous persiflage nor terminological inexactitude throw into palpitating tantrums the balanced cerebration of the judicial mind. The integral yoga of shanti and neeti is so much the cornerstone of the judicial process that criticism, wild or valid, authentic or anathematic, shall have little purchase over the mentation of the Court. I quite realise how hard it is to resist, with sage silence, the shafts of acid speech; and, how alluring it is to succumb to the temptation of argumentation where the thorn, not the rose, triumphs. Truth’s taciturn strategy, the testimony of history says, has a higher power than a hundred thousand tongues or pens. In contempt jurisdiction, silence is a sign of strength since our power is wide and we are prosecutor and judge.”

In the second case, this Court was called upon to initiate contempt proceedings against Shri P. Shiv Shanker who, in his capacity as Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs, delivered a speech in the meeting of Bar Council of Hyderabad on November 28, 1987 criticising the Supreme Court. Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) referred to large number of precedents and made the following observation:

“Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men” — said Lord Atkin in Ambard v. Attorney- General for Trinidad and Tobago. Administration of justice and judges are open to public criticism and public scrutiny. Judges have their accountability to the society and their accountability must be judged by their conscience and oath of their office, that is, to defend and uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear and favour. This the judges must do in the light given to them to determine what is right. And again as has been said in the famous speech of Abraham Lincoln in 1965: “With malice towards none, with charity for all, we must strive to do the right, in the light given to us to determine that right.” Any criticism about the judicial system or the judges which hampers the administration of justice or which erodes the faith in the objective approach of judges and brings administration of justice into ridicule must be prevented. The contempt of court proceedings arise out of that attempt. Judgments can be criticised; the motives of the judges need not be attributed, it brings the administration of justice into deep disrepute. Faith in the administration of justice is one of the pillars through which democratic institution functions and sustains. In the free market place of ideas criticisms about the judicial system or judges should be welcomed, so long as such criticisms do not impair or hamper the administration of justice. This is how courts should approach the powers vested in them as judges to punish a person for an alleged contempt, be it by taking notice of the matter suo motu or at the behest of the litigant or a lawyer. 

It has been well said that if judges decay, the contempt power will not save them and so the other side of the coin is that judges, like Caesar’s wife, must be above suspicion, per Krishna Iyer, J. in Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court. It has to be admitted frankly and fairly that there has been erosion of faith in the dignity of the court and in the majesty of law and that has been caused not so much by the scandalising remarks made by politicians or ministers but the inability of the courts of law to deliver quick and substantial justice to the needy. Many today suffer from remediless evils which courts of justice are incompetent to deal with. Justice cries in silence for long, far too long. The procedural wrangle is eroding the faith in our justice system. It is a criticism which the judges and lawyers must make about themselves. We must turn the searchlight inward. At the same time we cannot be oblivious of the attempts made to decry or denigrate the judicial process, if it is seriously done. This question was examined in Rama Dayal Markarha v. State of Madhya Pradesh where it was held that fair and reasonable criticism of a judgment which is a public document or which is a public act of a judge concerned with administration of justice would not constitute contempt. In fact such fair and reasonable criticism must be encouraged because after all no one, much less judges, can claim infallibility. Such a criticism may fairly assert that the judgment is incorrect or an error has been committed both with regard to law or established facts. But when it is said that the judge had a predisposition to convict or deliberately took a turn in discussion of evidence because he had already made up his mind to convict the accused, or has a wayward bend of mind, is attributing motives, lack of dispassionate and objective approach and analysis and prejudging of the issues which would bring administration of justice into ridicule. Criticism of the judges would attract greater attention than others and such criticism sometimes interferes with the administration of justice and that must be judged by the yardstick whether it brings the administration of justice into ridicule or hampers administration of justice. After all it cannot be denied that predisposition or subtle prejudice or unconscious prejudice or what in Indian language is called “sanskar” are inarticulate major premises in decision making process. That element in the decision making process cannot be denied, it should be taken note of.”

In Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court (1974) 1 SCC 374, Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for himself and P.N. Bhagwati, J., as he then was,emphasized the necessity of maintaining constitutional balance between two great but occasionally conflicting principles i.e. freedom of expression which is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and fair and fearless justice, referred to “republican justification” suggested in the American system and observed:

“Maybe, we are nearer the republican justification suggested in the American system:

“In this country, all courts derive their authority from the people, and hold it in trust for their security and benefit. In this state, all judges are elected by the people, and hold their authority, in a double sense, directly from them; the power they exercise is but the authority of the people themselves, exercised through courts as their agents. It is the authority and laws emanating from the people, which the judges sit to exercise and enforce. Contempt against these courts, the administration of their laws, are insults offered to the authority of the people themselves, and not to the humble agents of the law, whom they employ in the conduct of their Government.”

This shift in legal philosophy will broaden the base of the citizen’s right to criticise and render the judicial power more socially valid. We are not subjects of a king but citizens of a republic and a blanket ban through the contempt power, stifling criticism of a strategic institution, namely, administration of Justice, thus forbidding the right to argue for reform of the judicial process and to comment on the performance of the judicial personnel through outspoken or marginally excessive criticism of the instrumentalities of law and justice, may be a tall order. For, change through free speech is basic to our democracy, and to prevent change through criticism is to petrify the organs of democratic Government. The judicial instrument is no exception. To cite vintage rulings of English Courts and to bow to decisions of British Indian days as absolutes is to ignore the law of all laws that the rule of law must keep pace with the Rule of life. To make our point, we cannot resist quoting McWhinney, who wrote:

“The dominant theme in American philosophy of law today must be the concept of change — or revolution — in law. In Mr Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ own aphorism, it is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. prestige argument, from age alone, that because a claimed legal rule has lasted a certain length of time it must automatically be valid and binding at the present day, regardless of changes in basic societal conditions and expectations, is no longer very persuasive. According to the basic teachings of the Legal Realist and policy schools of law, society itself is in continuing state of flux at the present day; and the positive law, therefore, if it is to continue to be useful in the resolution of contemporary major social conflicts and social problems, must change in measure with the society. What we have, therefore, concomitantly with our conception of society in revolution is a conception of law itself, as being in a condition of flux, of movement. On this view, law is not a frozen, static body of rules but rules in a continuous process of change and adaptation; and the judge, at the final appellate level anyway, is a part — a determinant part — of this dynamic process of legal evolution.”

This approach must inform Indian law, including contempt law.

It is very necessary to remember the legal transformation in our value system on the inauguration of the Constitution, and the dogmas of the quiet past must change with the challenges of the stormy present. The great words of Justice Holmes uttered in a different context bear repetition in this context: 

“But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year, if not every day, we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country."

Have a look at the decision.

Property tax liability both on seller and buyer: High Court

Holding that the liability of property tax was not upon a person but upon the property and thus the Municipal Corporation could require both the seller as well as the buyer to ensure that the dues of property tax are cleared, the Calcutta High Court in a recently reported decision [Diamond Infotech Pvt. Ltd. v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation, AIR 2010 NOC 910] clarified the concepts relating to property tax and the flucrum of liability therein.

The Single Judge of the High Court, disposing the petition, inter alia observed as under;

The first basic principle is that property tax is a liability attached to the property and travels with the property. It does not matter who is the owner of the property or in occupation of the property or has any other interest in it. If some tax is due for a particular property, that tax can be realised by sale of the property. So, for realisation of property tax, directions in personem, like orders upon the owner or occupier or trustee or beneficiary to pay the property tax may not be necessary. The property itself is sold and the tax realised out of the sale price. Just like in maritime law, maritime liens are attached to the ship or res and are discharged by sale of the ship and distribution of the sale proceeds in satisfaction of those claims. (See Municipal Corporation of Delhi – vs – M/s. Trigon Investment and Trading Private Limited and another, reported in 1996 SC 1579).

The Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act 1980 (in short the Act) has a detailed scheme for levy and collection of taxes. Levy of taxes is provided for in sub parts A to G of Part IV. This part provides detailed provisions for determination of annual valuation, provisional assessment, invitation of objections to it and final assessment. Sub part ‘G’ provides for incidence and payment of property tax. Section 193 enacts that if the land or building is un-let (as is the case here) tax would have to be paid by the person who has the right to let such land or building. Therefore, before transfer of this flat the erstwhile owner had the liability to pay the property tax and after transfer, the buyer. Now let us come to the Transfer of Property Act 1882. The seller has to pay the property tax which has accrued in respect of the property up to the date of the sale. [Section 55 (1)(g)]. The seller is therefore liable to pay any tax liability up to the date of sale and the buyer such liability which accrues after the date of sale. This is the general law. 

Section 183(1) enjoins both seller and buyer to give notice of transfer to the corporation within three months of such transaction. In this case neither seller nor buyer had notified the  corporation. What is the effect of such default? Section 183 (4) says that if the transferor defaults he continues to be liable. It adds that ‘nothing in this section would be deemed to affect the liability of the transferee for payment of the property tax on such land and building.’ Therefore, under this sub-section if there is no notice of transfer the liability of the transferor and transferee is concurrent for after sale tax. But this sub-section has to be harmoniously read with the above provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 193 of the Act. In law the seller would remain liable for any tax accrued up to the date of sale and the buyer to pay any tax accruing thereafter.

The respondent corporation, in the absence of any notice of transfer would have the right to recover such tax accruing after sale from either or both. Then, it would be for the party paying the other party’s share to seek its recovery from such party in a proper proceeding. This is the effect after such harmonious construction. But sub-section 4 nevertheless makes it very clear that the  liability of the transferee cannot be avoided. Neither, the right of the corporation to realise such amount by sale of the property. I have cited the part providing for levy of taxes. Now chapter XVI of the Act deals with recovery of taxes. At the time of levy of taxes there is provision for provisional assessment and objections and hearing of such objections before assessment is made. Therefore, at this stage a party interested in a property has a chance of hearing before tax on the property is determined. But after tax is determined I find no provision for hearing when there is default in tax and proceedings are taken for recovery under chapter XVI. When the person interested in property has been heard before assessment and tax levied, accordingly, then he has had an opportunity of disputing the tax at that stage. The distress warrant is issued only for non-payment of tax. When this tax has been determined the scope for dispute in a distress warrant proceeding is very limited and must be confined to ascertaining the tax, interest and penalty impositions.

A purchaser of a premise has not had an opportunity of participating in the assessment proceedings. He may not know the details of the tax liability, the interest, the penalty, the period for which they are un-cleared and other particulars at the time of buying the property, though a prudent purchaser ought to make such enquiry and ascertain it. In any event, he must be given an opportunity of disputing it or paying it. Therefore, before a distress warrant is issued this kind of a purchaser should be heard. Also, the owner or occupier of a property which is proposed to be sold under a distress warrant must be given a chance of representing his case before the distress warrant is issued. These principles of natural justice have to be read into these sections for them to be valid. Our Division Bench decision in the case of Calcutta Municipal Corporation and ors. –v – Ram Niranjan Kajaria & Ors., reported in 2009 (1) CHN 382 has no application in this case because that case was concerned with challenge to an annual valuation thrown by a purchaser. Notice of transfer was not given. The court held that such transferee could not be heard in the assessment proceedings.

Have a look at the decision.