3 Mar 2011

Appointment of Central Vigilance Commissioner illegal: Supreme Court

Issuing a writ of Quo Warranto and thus quashing the notification appointing Mr. P.J. Thomas as the Central Vigilance Commissioner of India, the Supreme Court in Centre for PIL v. Union of India allowed the Public Interest Litigation with consequential relief. Holding that "institution is more important than individual", a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, comprising of the Chief Justice of India himself, made interesting observations in regard to the policy and the constitutional structure in the country. In the opinion of the Court, the non-consideration of the pending criminal case (for corruption) against the CVC was an instance of acute non-consideration of vital material required to be taken into account before recommending the name of the person for the CVC to the President, requiring the recommendation to be declared illegal.

It observed inter alia as under;
2. Government is not accountable to the courts in respect of policy decisions. However, they are accountable for the legality of such decisions. While deciding this case, we must keep in mind the difference between legality and merit as also between judicial review and merit review. On 3rd September, 2010, the High Powered Committee (“HPC” for short), duly constituted under the proviso to Section 4(1) of the 2003 Act, had recommended the name of Shri P.J. Thomas for appointment to the post of Central Vigilance Commissioner. The validity of this recommendation falls for judicial scrutiny in this case. If a duty is cast under the proviso to Section 4(1) on the HPC to recommend to the President the name of the selected candidate, the integrity of that decision making process is got to ensure that the powers are exercised for the purposes and in the manner envisaged by the said Act, otherwise such recommendation will have no existence in the eye of law.
20. Vigilance is an integral part of all government institutions. Anti-corruption measures are the responsibility of the Central Government. Towards this end the Government set up the following departments :
(i) CBI
(ii) Administrative Vigilance Division in DoPT
(iii) Domestic Vigilance Units in the Ministries / Departments, Government companies, Government Corporations, nationalized banks and PSUs
(iv) CVC
21. Thus, CVC as an integrity institution was set up by the Government of India in 1964 vide Government Resolution pursuant to the recommendations of Santhanam Committee. However, it was not a statutory body at that time. According to the recommendations of the Santhanam Committee, CVC, in its functions, was supposed to be independent of the executive. The sole purpose behind setting up of the CVC was to improve the vigilance administration of the country.
22. In September, 1997, the Government of India established the Independent Review Committee to monitor the functioning of CVC and to examine the working of CBI and the Enforcement Directorate. Independent Review Committee vide its report of December, 1997 suggested that CVC be given a statutory status. It also recommended that the selection of Central Vigilance Commissioner shall be made by a High Powered Committee comprising of the Prime Minister, the Home Minister and the Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha. It also recommended that the appointment shall be made by the President of India on the specific recommendations made by the HPC. That, the CVC shall be responsible for the efficient functioning of CBI; CBI shall report to CVC about cases taken up for investigations; the appointment of CBI Director shall be by a Committee headed by the Central Vigilance Commissioner; the Central Vigilance Commissioner shall have a minimum fixed tenure and that a Committee headed by the Central Vigilance Commissioner shall prepare a panel for appointment of Director of Enforcement.
23. On 18th December, 1997 the judgment in the case of Vineet Narain v. Union of India [(1998) 1 SCC 226] came to be delivered. Exercising authority under Article 32 read with Article 142, this Court in order to implement an important constitutional principle of the rule of law ordered that CVC shall be given a statutory status as recommended by Independent Review Committee. All the above recommendations of Independent Review Committee were ordered to be given a statutory status.
24. The judgment in Vineet Narain’s case (supra) was followed by the 1999 Ordinance under which CVC became a multi-member Commission headed by Central Vigilance Commissioner. The 1999 Ordinance conferred statutory status on CVC. The said Ordinance incorporated the directions given by this Court in Vineet Narain’s case. Suffice it to state, that, the 1999 Ordinance stood promulgated to improve the vigilance administration and to create a culture of integrity as far as government administration is concerned. 
25. The said 1999 Ordinance was ultimately replaced by the enactment of the 2003 Act which came into force with effect from 11th September, 2003.
26. The 2003 Act has been enacted to provide for the constitution of a Central Vigilance Commission as an institution to inquire or cause inquiries to be conducted into offences alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by certain categories of public servants of the Central Government, corporations established by or under any Central Act, Government companies, societies and local authorities owned or controlled by the Central Government and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto (see Preamble). By way of an aside, we may point out that in Australia, US, UK and Canada there exists a concept of integrity institutions. In Hongkong we have an Independent Commission against corruption. In Western Australia there exists a statutory Corruption Commission. In Queensland, we have Misconduct Commission. In New South Wales there is Police Integrity Commission. All these come within the category of integrity institutions. In our opinion, CVC is an integrity institution. This is clear from the scope and ambit (including the functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner) of the 2003 Act. It is an Institution which is statutorily created under the Act. It is to supervise vigilance administration. The 2003 Act provides for a mechanism by which the CVC retains control over CBI. That is the reason why it is given autonomy and insulation from external influences under the 2003 Act.
30. For the sake of brevity, we may refer to the Selection Committee as High Powered Committee. The key word in the proviso is the word “recommendation”. While making the recommendation, the HPC performs a statutory duty. The impugned recommendation dated 3rd September, 2010 is in exercise of the statutory power vested in the HPC under the proviso to Section 4(1). The post of Central Vigilance Commissioner is a statutory post. The Commissioner performs statutory functions as enumerated in Section 8. The word ‘recommendation’ in the proviso stands for an informed decision to be taken by the HPC on the basis of a consideration of relevant material keeping in mind the purpose, object and policy of the 2003 Act. As stated, the object and purpose of the 2003 Act is to have an integrity Institution like CVC which is in charge of vigilance administration and which constitutes an anti-corruption mechanism. In its functions, the CVC is similar to Election Commission, Comptroller and Auditor General, Parliamentary Committees etc. Thus, while making the recommendations, the service conditions of the candidate being a public servant or civil servant in the past is not the sole criteria. The HPC must also take into consideration the question of institutional competency into account. If the selection adversely affects institutional competency and functioning then it shall be the duty of the HPC not to recommend such a candidate. Thus, the institutional integrity is the primary consideration which the HPC is required to consider while making recommendation under Section 4 for appointment of Central Vigilance Commissioner. In the present case, this vital aspect has not been taken into account by the HPC while recommending the name of Shri P.J. Thomas for appointment as Central Vigilance Commissioner. We do not wish to discount personal integrity of the candidate. What we are emphasizing is that institutional integrity of an institution like CVC has got to be kept in mind while recommending the name of the candidate. Whether the incumbent would or would not be able to function? Whether the working of the Institution would suffer? If so, would it not be the duty of the HPC not to recommend the person. In this connection the HPC has also to keep in mind the object and the policy behind enactment of the 2003 Act. Under Section 5(1) the Central Vigilance Commissioner shall hold the office for a term of 4 years. Under Section 5(3) the Central Vigilance Commissioner shall, before he enters upon his office, makes and subscribes before the President an oath or affirmation according to the form set out in the Schedule to the Act. Under Section 6(1) the Central Vigilance Commissioner shall be removed from his office only by order of the President and that too on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity after the Supreme Court, on a reference made to it by the President, has on inquiry reported that the Central Vigilance Commissioner be removed. These provisions indicate that the office of the Central Vigilance Commissioner is not only given independence and insulation from external influences, it also indicates that such protections are given in order to enable the Institution of CVC to work in a free and fair environment. The prescribed form of oath under Section 5(3) requires Central Vigilance Commissioner to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of the country and to perform his duties without fear or favour. All these provisions indicate that CVC is an integrity institution. The HPC has, therefore, to take into consideration the values independence and impartiality of the Institution. The said Committee has to consider the institutional competence. It has to take an informed decision keeping in mind the above mentioned vital aspects indicated by the purpose and policy of the 2003 Act.
33. xxx The system governance established by the Constitution is based on distribution of powers and functions amongst the three organs of the State, one of them being the Executive whose duty is to enforce the laws made by the Parliament and administer the country through various statutory bodies like CVC which is empowered to perform the function of vigilance administration. Thus, we are concerned with the institution and its integrity including institutional competence and functioning and not the desirability of the candidate alone who is going to be the Central Vigilance Commissioner, though personal integrity is an important quality. It is the independence and impartiality of the institution like CVC which has to be maintained and preserved in larger interest of the rule of law [see Vineet Narain (supra)]. While making recommendations, the HPC performs a statutory duty. Its duty is to recommend. While making recommendations, the criteria of the candidate being a public servant or a civil servant in the past is not the sole consideration. The HPC has to look at the record and take into consideration whether the candidate would or would not be able to function as a Central Vigilance Commissioner. Whether the institutional competency would be adversely affected by pending proceedings and if by that touchstone the candidate stands disqualified then it shall be the duty of the HPC not to recommend such a candidate. In the present case apart from the pending criminal proceedings, as stated above, between the period 2000 and 2004 various notings of DoPT recommended disciplinary proceedings against Shri P.J. Thomas in respect of Palmolein case. Those notings have not been considered by the HPC. As stated above, the 2003 Act confers autonomy and independence to the institution of CVC. Autonomy has been conferred so that the Central Vigilance Commissioner could act without fear or favour. We may reiterate that institution is more important than an individual. This is the test laid down in para 93 of N. Kannadasan’s case (supra). In the present case, the HPC has failed to take this test into consideration. The recommendation dated 3rd September, 2010 of HPC is entirely premised on the blanket clearance given by CVC on 6th October, 2008 and on the fact of respondent No. 2 being appointed as Chief Secretary of Kerala on 18th September, 2007; his appointment as Secretary of Parliamentary Affairs and his subsequent appointment as Secretary, Telecom. In the process, the HPC, for whatever reasons, has failed to take into consideration the pendency of Palmolein case before the Special Judge, Thiruvananthapuram being case CC 6 of 2003; the sanction accorded by the Government of Kerala on 30th November, 1999 under Section 197 Cr.P.C. for prosecuting inter alia Shri P.J. Thomas for having committed alleged offence under Section 120-B IPC read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act; the judgment of the Supreme Court dated 29th March, 2000 in the case of K. Karunakaran v. State of Kerala and Another in which this Court observed that, “the registration of the FIR against Shri Karunakaran and others cannot be held to be the result of malafides or actuated by extraneous considerations. The menace of corruption cannot be permitted to be hidden under the carpet of legal technicalities and in such cases probes conducted are required to be determined on facts and in accordance with law”. Further, even the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Criminal Revision Petition No. 430 of 2001 has not been considered. It may be noted that the clearance of CVC dated 6th October, 2008 was not binding on the HPC. However, the aforestated judgment of the Supreme Court dated 29th March, 2000 in the case of K. Karunakaran vs. State of Kerala and Another in Criminal Appeal No. 86 of 1998 was certainly binding on the HPC and, in any event, required due weightage to be given while making recommendation, particularly when the said judgment had emphasized the importance of probity in high offices. This is what we have repeatedly emphasized in our judgment – institution is more important than individual(s). For the above reasons, it is declared that the recommendation made by the HPC on 3rd September, 2010 is non-est in law.
Setting aside the objections of the CVC, that the Court cannot issue a writ of quo warranto so as to remove him from the post, the Supreme Court also held that the appointment of CVC was not a personal choice of the President but was a decision of the Prime Minister which given the Constitutional set-up of the country, was binding on the President.

The Supreme Court also issued directions required to be considered in future for appointment of Central Vigilance Commissioner by the High Powered Committee constituted under the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 comprising of the Prime Minister as its Chairman and Home Minister and Leader of Opposition as the other two members. The Court issued the following directions;
55. No reason has been given as to why in the present case the zone of consideration stood restricted only to the civil service. We therefore direct that : 
(i) In our judgment we have held that there is no prescription of unanimity or consensus under Section 4(2) of the 2003 Act. However, the question still remains as to what should be done in cases of difference of opinion amongst the Members of the High Powered Committee. As in the present case, if one Member of the Committee dissents that Member should give reasons for the dissent and if the majority disagrees with the dissent, the majority shall give reasons for overruling the dissent. This will bring about fairness-in-action. Since we have held that legality of the choice or selection is open to judicial review we are of the view that if the above methodology is followed transparency would emerge which would also maintain the integrity of the decision making process. 
(ii) In future the zone of consideration should be in terms of Section 3(3) of the 2003 Act. It shall not be restricted to civil servants. 
(iii) All the civil servants and other persons empanelled shall be outstanding civil servants or persons of impeccable integrity. 
(iv) The empanelment shall be carried out on the basis of rational criteria, which is to be reflected by recording of reasons and/or noting akin to reasons by the empanelling authority. 
(v) The empanelment shall be carried out by a person not below the rank of Secretary to the Government of India in the concerned Ministry. 
(vi) The empanelling authority, while forwarding the names of the empanelled officers/persons, shall enclose complete information, material and data of the concerned officer/person, whether favourable or adverse. Nothing relevant or material should be withheld from the Selection Committee. It will not only be useful but would also serve larger public interest and enhance public confidence if the contemporaneous service record and acts of outstanding performance of the officer under consideration, even with adverse remarks is specifically brought to the notice of the Selection Committee. 
(vii) The Selection Committee may adopt a fair and transparent process of consideration of the empanelled officers. 

1 comment:

sriram srirangam said...

Thanks a lot for the post .