25 Sept 2010

Inherent power to extend time: Supreme Court

In a recent decision [D.V. Paul v.Manisha Lalwani] the Supreme Court has declared that it is inherent power of a court to extend time for ensuring performance of an act. Referring to Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which regulates the procedure of civil courts) the Supreme Court observed that the civil courts have the discretion to extend time to allow compliance. The Bench inter alia observed as under;
16. In so far as the first aspect is concerned Section 148 of the CPC, in our opinion, clearly reserves in favour of the Court the power to enlarge the time required for doing an act prescribed or allowed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 148 of the Code may at this stage be extracted:- 
“148. Enlargement of time. Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period not exceeding thirty days in total, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired.” 
17. A plain reading of the above would show that when any  period or time is granted by the Court for doing any act, the Court has the discretion from time to time to enlarge such period even if the time originally fixed or granted by the Court has expired. It is evident from the language employed in the provision that the power given to the Court is discretionary and intended to be exercised only to meet the ends of justice. Several decisions of this Court have explained the ambit and scope of the powers exercisable under Section 148 of the CPC. In Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das, 1961 (3) SCR 763, this Court observed:
“Section 148 of the Code, in terms, allows extension of time, even if the original period fixed has expired, and Section 149 is equally liberal. A fortiori, those sections could be invoked by the applicant, when the time had not actually expired. That the application was filed in the vacation when a Division Bench was not sitting should have been considered in dealing with it even on 13.7.1954, when it was actually heard. The order, though passed after the expiry of the time fixed by the original judgment, would have operated from 8.7.1954. How undesirable it is to fix time peremptorily for a future happening which leaves the Court powerless to deal with events that might arise in between, it is not necessary to decide in this appeal. These orders turn out, often enough to be inexpedient. Such procedural orders, though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estop a Court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. For example, it cannot be said that, if the appellant had started with the full money ordered to be paid and came well in time but set upon and robbed by thieves the day previous, he could not ask for extension of time, or that the Court was powerless to extend it. Such orders are not like the law of the Medes and the Persians. Cases are known in which Courts have moulded their practice to meet a situation such as this and to have restored a suit or proceeding, even though a final order had been passed.”
18. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Chinnamarkathian v. Ayyavoo, 1982 (1) SCC 159, where this Court declared that the scope and exercise of the jurisdiction to grant time to do a thing, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary curtailing, denying or withholding such jurisdiction, the jurisdiction to grant time would inhere in its ambit the jurisdiction to extend time initially fixed by it. The Court also called in the principle of equity when circumstances are to be taken into account for fixing a length of time within which a certain action is to be taken, the Court retains itself the jurisdiction to re-examine the alteration or modification which may necessitate extension of time. The following passage from the decision is apposite: 
“It is well accepted principle statutorily recognized in Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure that where a period is fixed or granted by the Court for doing any act prescribed or allowed by the Code, the Court may in its discretion from time to time enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or granted may expire. If a Court in exercise of the jurisdiction can grant time to do a thing, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary curtailing, denying or withholding such jurisdiction, the jurisdiction to grant time would inhere in its ambit the jurisdiction to extend time initially fixed by it. Passing a composite order would be acting in disregard of the jurisdiction in that while granting time simultaneously the Court denies to itself the jurisdiction to extend time. The principle of equity is that when some circumstances are to be taken into account for fixing a length of time within which a certain action is to be taken, the Court retains to itself the jurisdiction to reexamine the alteration or modification of circumstances which may necessitate extension of time. If the Court by its own act denies itself the jurisdiction to do so, it would be denying to itself the jurisdiction which in the absence of a negative provision, it undoubtedly enjoys.” 
19. Reference may also be made to the decisions of this Court in Jogdhayan v. Babu Ram, 1983 (1) SCC 26, Johri Singh v. Sukh Pal Singh, 1989 (4) SCC 403 and Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta, 1985 (3) SCC 53.
20. In Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union of India, 2005 (6) SCC 344, this Court had an occasion to examine whether the restriction placed by the amendment of Section 148 on the power of the Court to grant extension of time beyond 30 days was reasonable. This Court held that a power that is inherent in the Court to pass orders that it considers necessary for meeting the ends of justice and preventing abuse of the process of the Court cannot be taken away by putting an upper limit on the period for which an extension can be granted. Extension beyond the maximum period of 30 days was accordingly held permissible in the following words: 
“The amendment made in Section 148 affects the power of the Court to enlarge time that may have been fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code. The amendment provides that the period shall not exceed 30 days in total. Before amendment, there was no such restriction of time. Whether the Court has no inherent power to extend the time beyond 30 days is the question. We have no doubt that the upper limit fixed in Section 148 cannot take away the inherent power of the Court to pass orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of the Court. The rigid operation of the section would lead to absurdity. Section 151 has, therefore, to be allowed to operate fully. Extension beyond maximum of 30 days, thus, can be permitted if the act could not be performed within 30 days for reasons beyond the control of the party. We are not dealing with a case wheretime for doing an act has been prescribed under the provisions of the Limitation Act which cannot be extended either under Section 148 or Section 151. We are dealing with a case where the time is fixed or granted by the court for performance of an act prescribed or allowed by the court.”

1 comment:

dhiraj said...

very useful thanks